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Abstract 
 
  
Few issues in modern corporate governance have received as much attention 
lately as executive compensation. This research deals with a highly controversial 
yet widespread practice in executive pay: stock options plans. Are stock options 
the answer to efficiently align incentives, bridging the gap between cash-flow 
rights and control rights? A design that delivers that goal proves crucial. This 
study aims to contribute to the current debate on such a heated corporate 
governance issue by presenting a systematic analysis of stock option design in 
Spanish largest and most liquid companies, out of the entire population of the 
Ibex 35 stock market index. The specific design variables to be examined are 
strike price, vesting period, maturity, repricing and trading restrictions. A blend 
of the optimal contracting and the managerial power approaches are applied to 
explore for significant deviations from the incentive-alignment paradigm. 
Finally, panel data analysis is conducted to identify potential relationships 
between the above mentioned variables and risk-adjusted returns for Ibex 35 
firms with stock option plans.  
 
Keywords:  Corporate governance; Incentive-alignment; Stock options; CAPM 
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1. Introduction 
Business, academia and regulators alike continue to praise corporate governance 
as a crucial element in promoting sound and trustworthy firms. Solid, reliable 
governance practices are strategic assets for firms to compete, not least as many 
struggle to rebuild trust following the 2007-08 financial crisis. Executive 
compensation remains a pillar of modern corporate governance, and as such, a 
highly relevant field of research, with profound theoretical and managerial 
implications.  
 
Executive compensation relies heavily on equity-based systems, so as to tie 
managers’ wealth to firm value. A stock option plan is one way to secure that 
linkage, grating employees a contingent share of ownership. Such a system 
allows designated employees to benefit financially in the appreciation of their 
employer’s stock through the purchase of an ownership interest in the business.  
 
Many believe employees’ motivation is enhanced when they hold stock in the 
company they work for. When that equity holding is part of the compensation 
package, the contract design deserves special attention, as it reflects the firm’s 
ability –and willingness- to align incentives, particularly in so far as linking pay 
to performance. Admittedly, executive stock options (hereinafter simply referred 
to as stock options) have earned a reputation for rent extraction by managers at 
the expense of shareholders, as contracts have often been shaped in a way that 
encourages management to show steep earnings growth, which in turn cultivates 
undue risk taking and even fraud. Contract design is therefore expected to play a 
central role in avoiding this short-termism and creating longer-term value. 
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Incentive contracting is set to align the economic interests of employer and 
employee -or principal and agent when viewed through the lens of agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Shareholders’ (principals’) goal is to see the value 
of their stock holdings increase, and granting stock options is one way of 
inducing managers (agents) to focus on that goal, by sharing in the stock price 
appreciation gains according to their respective holdings.  
 
Compensation systems largely serve three functions: compensating employees for 
completed work, reducing principal-agent costs by more closely aligning 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders, and recruiting or retaining 
management. Stock options might not be the most efficient form of compensation 
to achieve all three goals yet their comparative advantage arguably lies in their 
ability to align incentives.  
 
The ultimate purpose of granting stock options is therefore to align 
management’s interests with shareholders’, alleviating the agency problem in the 
sense of Jensen and Meckling (1976). And given the informational advantage 
from running the firm that managers are likely to enjoy over shareholders –more 
so in large, dispersed ownership companies-, closing that gap remains critical to 
prevent undue transfers of rent, usually at the expense of stockholders and 
debtholders.  
 
Despite stock options accruing mounting criticism -heavily blamed for de-linking 
pay from performance-, they have been fairly popular among Spanish large 
capitalization firms, accounting for a significant share of the executive 
compensation package. Building on such relevant role in executive pay practices, 
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this research joins the debate around the efficient design of stock option 
contracts.  
 
The document is organized as follows: the next section (2) states the overall 
purpose of the study, research questions, units of analysis and expected 
contribution. Section 3 presents the conceptual foundations on which the study 
builds, while section 4 focuses on option-based compensation, from its rationale 
to its current role in executive pay. Section 5 reviews the relevant literature that 
makes for the theoretical framework of the study, identifying the research gap 
that leads to the research questions, which are revisited. Section 6 discusses the 
methodology applied to explore potential answers to those research questions. In 
section 7 the data collected are presented. Section 8 offers a critical review of the 
stock option contract design in the sampled firms. Section 9 analizes the data, 
and discusses the findings resulting from applying the chosen methods to carry 
out the analysis on the data collected. Section 10 provides an overview of the 
Spanih regulatory framework, while section 11 addresses the controversial 
accounting treatment of stock option plans. Finally, conclusions, along with 
theoretical and managerial implications, limitations and further research are 
discussed in section 12.  
 
2. Research Purpose and Reserch Questions 
 
This study consists of a systematic analysis of stock option design in the 
companies listed in the Spanish Ibex 35 stock market index. The unit of analysis 
is therefore the stock option plan –in many cases the different plans- granted by 
such companies.  
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The research purpose is twofold: first, it aims at identifying those contractual 
features that give raise to potential agency problems by deviating from the 
incentive-alignment paradigm. The incentive-alignment drivers to be examined 
are strike price, vesting period, option maturity, option repricing and trading 
restrictions following option exercise. Building on that evidence, a two-step 
panel data analysis is conducted to first identify and measure the impact of stock 
option plans on risk-adjusted returns, and then break down that impact for each 
of the design variables mentioned above, testing out their contribution to risk-
adjusted returns. The underlying rationale is that increased incentive-alignment 
leads to higher risk-adjusted returns.  
 
Executive compensation in this study refers to the pay package designed for 
managers and board members of large publicly traded companies in Spain, using 
the Ibex 35 index as proxy for such firms.  
 
Granting stock options is a widespread compensation practice, making for a 
relevant share of executive pay in competitive labor markets. Popularity came 
along with high doses of criticism, largely on grounds of stock price 
manipulation aiming at timing the option exercise to maximize utility for the 
beneficiaries at the expense of shareholders. A significant share of the literature 
review builds on evidence from the United States of America (U.S.), where stock 
options developed into an almost standard variable compensation component, 
extensively used to attract and retain talent. In Spain, this pay system was 
adopted by several large, listed companies towards the end of the 90s, with 
decreasing enthusiasm since the mid-2000s. A number of reasons, including tax 
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incentives, can help explain such trajectory, yet this study claims that the 
perceived de-linkage between pay and performance that stock options might 
exacerbate, has undermined this pay practice –worldwide, including Spain.   
 
It is indeed the extensive, ongoing debate around stock option plans providing 
compensation arguably disconnected from performance that accounts for the 
relevance of this study.  
 
The main research question addressed the gap in the literature identified in 
section 5, reflecting the purpose stated above:  
 
- How effectively do Ibex 35 stock option contracts align shareholders’ and 
executives’ incentives?  
 
The explanatory power of the optimal contracting and the managerial power 
approaches are used to tackle the driver question of this research. A 
complementary question reconnects the empirical study on the back of the 
question above, to the theories that inform the design of stock option contracts:  
 
- What mix of optimal contracting and managerial power can be identified in 
Ibex 35 stock option grants? 
 
Hence this research aims at providing empirical evidence on the interplay of 
optimal contracting and rent extraction –managerial power- in the pay setting 
process –and outcome- in the large capitalization firms that make the Ibex 35 
index.  
 
From the proposed agency theory perspective, the correlation between risk-
adjusted returns and contract design is tested to explore whether the five 
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contractual terms under analysis relate to improved principal-agent alignment as 
measured by increased risk-adjusted returns.  
 
The causality implied in this study is that increased incentive-alignment cuts 
down agency costs by reducing monitoring expenditure along with the residual 
loss arising from conflicting management-shareholder objectives, therefore 
translating into higher risk-adjusted returns. The business case for stock options 
as an efficient corporate governance mechanism requires those higher risk-
adjusted returns from aligned incentives to surpass the cost of granted options.  
 
This research is empirical and positive in nature, aiming at making an original 
contribution to the executive compensation literature, with managerial 
implications potentially informing the design of stock option contracts. A 
normative stand is occasionally unavoidable, arising from the confrontation of 
the optimal contracting and the managerial power approaches.  
 
3.  Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation 
 
3.1 Corporate Governance - Conceptual Framework 
 
Monks and Minow (2011) provide a comprehensive definition of corporate 
governance, stating that it is the system by which businesses are directed and 
controlled, balancing out rights and responsibilities across different participants 
in the corporation. Most definitions indeed come to the conclusion that corporate 
governance is the distribution of rights and responsibilities among stakeholders 
in the firm. 
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Good corporate governance practices have a measurable economic value –e.g., 
lower premiums in corporate financing, increased leverage capacity, reduced 
price volatility- and should therefore be considered as a critical input in 
managerial decision-making, from overall corporate strategy to daily operational 
matters. In other words, corporate governance is likely to be a valuable 
intangible asset and a potential source of differentiation in today’s competitive 
marketplace.  
 
In their influential book, Monks and Minow (2011) further claim that ‘good’ 
corporate governance simply means that structures and processes are in place to 
ensure that directors have the ability to objectively and effectively assess 
management and corporate performance.  
 
While poor corporate governance does not always correlate to pay practices 
delinked from performance, it could be argued that good governance is typically 
a prerequisite that unlocks optimal compensation schemes, aligning the interests 
of owners and managers. A key question then arises: What is it meant by ‘good 
governance’ when it comes to compensation? As Ferrarini and Moloney (2004) 
suggest, ‘good governance’ should ensure that shareholders stay in control of the 
pay-setting process, through actions such as the set up of compensation 
committees, or the appointment of independent directors, so as to enhance board 
oversight of management. 
 
Corporate governance is undoubtedly a relevant tool for monitoring performance 
and boosting firm value. Its ultimate goal could be defined as to strike a balance 
between the control rights of agents and the cash-flow rights of principals, 
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aligning them towards value creation and avoiding rent extraction –in either 
direction- arising from asymmetry of information and potentially conflicting 
interests. 
 
As stated by the revised version of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2015), the link between compensation and firm performance is of 
particular relevance. Shareholders should be properly and timely informed of 
management remuneration so as to be able to assess the contribution of pay and 
incentives schemes –such as stock options plans- to firm long-term performance.  
 
Similar rationale inspired the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act) passed in 2010 in the United States, that provides 
shareholders with advisory votes on executive compensation -generally known as 
‘say-on-pay’-, both on the pay proposal as well as on the frequency of this ‘say-
on-pay’ consultation. Such practice has since been followed by multiples 
countries, including Spain, where amendments to its Ley del Mercado de Valores 
introducing say on pay were triggered by the broader Ley de Economía Sostenible 
(LES), passed in February 2011, and recently updated by the Ley 31/2014, which 
modifies the Ley de Sociedades de Capital (LSC). A more detailed discussion on 
this matter pertains to section 10. 
 
3.2 Executive Compensation 
 
When companies set pay structures, they typically do so by setting the range, that 
is, defining the compensation for the highest- and lowest-paying jobs before 
filling in remuneration for the jobs that fall in between.  
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As stated by McPhie and Sapin (2006), the executive compensation package is 
usually made up of a mix of the following components: 
 
- Base pay, not contingent on performance, for the core role and responsibilities 
of the day-to-day running of the organization. In countries like the U.S., this 
amount is often less than one million US dollars when not linked to 
performance measures, as tax restrictions are imposed on ‘excessive’ 
compensation -non-performance based pay over 1 million US dollars is not 
tax deductible. A claim followed, somehow paradoxically, blaming this ban 
for a hike in executive pay, pushing cash compensation towards the one 
million US dollars cap.  
- Annual bonuses for meeting yearly performance objectives 
- Long-term incentive payments for meeting performance objectives to be 
achieved typically over a two- to five-year period. These awards are likely to 
take the form of performance shares, performance units, or long-term cash 
incentives. 
- Restricted stock awards as an incentive to fuel employee ownership culture.  
- Stock options and stock appreciation rights (SARs) for increasing long-term 
firm value by inducing managers to remain aligned with the interests of 
shareholders. Up until recently, options enjoyed a very favorable accounting 
treatment, a highly controversial issue that is resumed in section 11. Option 
grants are always shown as a number of shares underlying the option.  
 
Although typically excluded from pay calculations, executive benefits and 
perquisites are also part of compensation agreements: 
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- Supplemental executive retirement plans, designed to make up for the 
difference between regular income during office term and actual pay after 
retirement, for the executive to maintain a comparable lifestyle. 
- Executive insurance plans that provide a source of retirement income and a 
richer death benefit for the executive’s family. These plans are used to 
guarantee retirement benefits from bankruptcy.  
- Miscellaneous executive perquisites and other compensation for various 
programs or negotiated deals that do not properly fit into the above 
categories, including perks such as country club dues and financial planning. 
These are often small numbers that disclose imputed income amounts for 
those additional special benefits, but can also include some very large 
amounts for items such as loan forgiveness, special insurance programs, or 
relocation expenses, among others. 
 
In most jurisdictions, listed companies are required to submit public filings 
disclosing the above mentioned items. Contrary to this dominant case, executive 
compensation is disclosed in a more aggregated manner by Spanish firms. 
Financial statements and annual corporate governance reports of Spanish publicly 
traded companies offer valuable insights into overall pay practices but the 
breakdown –i.e., what proportion comes from salary, bonus, stock options, 
retirement plans, perquisites, etc.- is only given for the Board of Directors –both 
for executive and non-executive directors. This enforcement, driven by the Ley 
31/2014 that modified the LSC, was further regulated by the Spanish stock 
market watchdog (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, CNMV) and also 
incorporated to the Spanish Corporate Governance Code of 2015 (principle #25, 
together with recommendations #50 and 56-64). Such moves towards increased 
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transparency was fueled by the European Commission, and articulated in 
multiples recommendations, among which the so-called Green Paper on the 
European Union Corporate Governance Framework, issued in April 2011, was 
particularly influential. This improved accountability –not only to shareholders 
but to society at large- makes the pay to performance link easier to monitor, 
while second-order efficiency gains arise from the market for executives, 
following benchmarking of pay size and components across firms. 
 
The wave of criticism executive compensation is rising can be readily explained 
by some astonishing figures. According to inflation-adjusted data extracted from 
Standard & Poor’s Execucomp Database, from 1978 up to the cut-off date of this 
study (2013), CEO compensation in the U.S. increased by 937 percent, doubling 
the averaged growth of the U.S. stock market and feeding a wave of resentment 
and increased activism when that number is compared to the 10.2 percent growth 
of the average American wage over that time window. In absolute figures, this 
relationship reveals an striking –an ashaming to most- contrast: the average total 
CEO pay in the U.S. in 2013 was nearly 260 times that of the average worker, 
while the same multiple was about 20 times in the mid 1960s. Mounting media, 
shareholder and society at large activism, led to the passing of a pay ratio 
disclosure requirement, ruled by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
in early August 2015. The debate is unlikely to cool down, as listed companies 
prepare themselves to make this very controversial relationship public starting in 
2018.  
 
The above cited Monks and Minow (2011) wisely advise to look at executive 
compensation as an investment opportunity. Such claim is indeed twofold: on the 
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one hand, money paid as compensation should yield a given return on investment, 
when human capital is considered as just any other asset. On the other hand, the 
authors claim that the compensation plan is a clear indicator of the firm’s value 
as an investment, as it reveals what the company’s goals are and how confident 
both the CEO and the Board are about the future. An investor allocating stocks in 
her portfolio would therefore be highly interested in knowing whether the 
company has an incentive scheme that aligns the interests of management and 
shareholders.  
 
Corporate success could certainly be tied to, and partially explained by, the 
annual and long-term incentive payouts laid down in labor contracts. If there are 
large gains from stock option exercises and substantial amounts in both vested 
and unvested options, the stock price appreciations that make those options have 
positive intrinsic value, are likely to signal a profitable, well-managed firm.  
 
4. Option-based compensation 
4.1  Option contracts: Some Preliminaries 
An option is a contract giving the owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy 
or sell a given quantity of an asset at a specified price at some time into the 
future. Such option is a derivative -or contingent claim- security: its value is 
derived from its relationship with the underlying asset. An option to buy the 
underlying asset is a call, and an option to sell the underlying asset is a put. 
Buying or selling the underlying asset via the option is known as exercising the 
option. The stated price paid (or received) is known as the exercise or strike 
price. In options terminology, the buyer of an option is frequently referred to as 
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the long and the seller of an option is referred to as the writer of the option, or 
the short.  
 
The option owner would only exercise her right to buy/sell the underlying asset if 
that is to her advantage, namely if she can make a profit. This right to exercise 
the option for a gain has a price, or premium, paid by the buyer to the writer 
(seller) of the option contract.  
 
Stock options are call options written on the company’s own stock. A stock 
option gives the recipient (the ‘optionee’) the right to buy a certain number of 
shares in the granting company under certain conditions agreed upon in the 
option contract. 
 
4.2 Basic Option Pricing Relationships 
 
For call options, the time T expiration value can be stated as: 
 
CT = Max [ST – E; 0] 
 
where: 
CT denotes the value of the call at expiration  
ST is the expiration date spot price of the underlying asset (the company’s own 
stock) 
E is the exercise price per unit of underlying asset, and 
Max is an abbreviation for denoting the maximum of the arguments within 
brackets 
 
A call option with ST > E expires ‘in-the-money’ and it will be exercised. If ST = 
E the option expires ‘at-the-money’, yielding no profit. If ST < E the call option 
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expires ‘out-of-the-money’ and will not be exercised. As denoted in the equation 
above, an option never carries negative value since if out-of-the-money, the 
option holder would not exercise her right but let it expire worthless, or with 
zero value.  
 
Figure 1 below graphs the call option pay-off from the buyer’s perspective. The 
call buyer can lose no more than the call premium paid but has an unlimited 
profit potential. Yet it should be stressed that executive stock option holders 
neither pay a premium nor can trade the rights they hold, hence stand to profit if 
the share price at vesting is above the strike price –contingent on exercise 
hurdles, if any- while stand to make no profit when the share price at vesting is 
below the strike price, in what is called the ‘all or nothing’ feature of traditional 
stock options.  
  
  
         Figure 1 – Call option pay-off: buyer’s perspective  
         Source:  Own elaboration 
Prof it 
+ 
- 
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ST 
-C E + C 
At-
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asset at expiration 
+∞ 
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4.3 Stock Option Dynamics 
Theoretically, stock options are intended to reduce the agency costs arising from 
the separation of ownership and control (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Managers –
the agents, hired to run the company- may be tempted to self-serve and pursue 
different interests than shareholders –the hiring principals- and thus sometimes 
act differently than shareholders would want them to. But if a sufficient portion 
of managers’ pay is tied to firm value by means of stock ownership, those agency 
costs should be reduced. One way to induce managers to act as owners is to grant 
them stock options that, as a matter of fact, turn them into owners upon exercise. 
 
Typically, stock options are issued at-the-money (strike price equals stock price 
on grant date), with a time to maturity of up to ten years, and a certain vesting 
period. The vesting period may last from several months to several years, during 
which options cannot be exercised. Following this exercise pattern, executive 
stock options are typified as Bermuda options, implying the existence of a 
deferral period in which they cannot be exercised. After vesting, most stock 
options become American options in that they can be exercised any time before 
maturity, while others still follow a predetermined set of exercise windows 
through maturity. 
 
As previously stated, the exercise price (also called grant or strike price) is often 
set as the market price of the underlying stock at grant date. Gains are eventually 
collected as the difference between the stock price and the strike price, should 
the former end up above the latter (in-the-money options) by the time of exercise. 
Conversely, if the market price of the underlying stock falls below the exercise 
price, the option is said to be out-of-the-money, or underwater. 
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A recurrent criticism of stock options found in the executive compensation 
literature and summarized by Damodaran (2005), points at the mismatch between 
their value for the granting firm –when measured as the opportunity cost of 
writing similar options to the open market- relative to the value for the optionee 
–who bears the constraints proper of executive stock options, largely arising from 
their non-tradability and vesting conditions. However, when their opportunity 
cost is measured relative to their market value as if they were financial options, 
the comparison would not hold on grounds that stock options are simply not 
financial options. Even when pricing stock options adjusting for the constraints 
that undermine their value, it could well be the case that such price is higher than 
the perceived value for the optionee –the price she would be willing to pay for 
them. Yet the value potentially forgone by the firm when granting stock options 
should be balanced out against the gains in terms of employee attraction, 
retention and motivation. Such intangibles, although challenging to measure, 
speak for the distinctive features of option grants and are often the very reason 
why stock options are chosen as compensation mechanism.  
 
According to option pricing theory, options are more valuable the more volatile 
the underlying stock is (Black and Scholes, 1973). When a company takes on 
risky projects, it becomes riskier, thereby increasing the volatility of its share 
price and the value of corresponding stock options. However, this might be in 
direct conflict with shareholders’ interests who, other things being equal, prefer 
stable cash flows. Stock options that are intended to get managers and 
shareholders aligned towards the same goal could end up rendering the opposite 
effect.  
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Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2003) counter argue based on agency theory core 
assumption, namely that managers are likely to behave more conservatively than 
it is in the best interest of shareholders because managers’ wealth is tied to the 
firm. They claim that stock options mitigate this problem by rewarding managers 
when the firm’s share price goes up but not punishing them when it goes down.  
Even if their claim depends on the subjective risk-preferences of managers and 
shareholders, it holds under risk-aversion assumptions. If the company 
undertakes risky ventures, shareholders can hedge or diversify away that risk 
against other risks that they hold in their portfolios. Conversely, managers do not 
have a portfolio of employers but have their human and financial capital tied to 
the company, what may deter them from taking those risky projects that provide 
superior returns to shareholders. Stock option contracts are likely to encourage 
managers to take those risks.  
 
These arguments, that conceptually frame this research, are further discussed in 
Section 5. 
 
4.4 A Snapshot at Current Practices in Executive Pay 
As noted earlier, executive compensation in this study refers to the pay package 
designed for managers and board members of large publicly traded companies. 
Following mainstream agency theory, the interests of these managers may 
diverge from those of shareholders, both because the former do not capture all 
the rewards of their efforts as well as the latter are typically unable to fully 
monitor the actions of the agents. An executive compensation package may 
therefore emerge as an effective corporate governance mechanism to more 
closely align those interests. When part of the executive pay is tied to firm value 
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through equity-based compensation, i.e. placed ‘at risk’, the executive is more 
likely to behave as a shareholder –what she indeed would eventually be as a 
result of her pay package-, pursuing long-term maximization of firm value. 
 
Equity-linked compensation has been praised for boosting stock prices and 
therefore the value of the ‘retain and reinvest’ strategy that has largely shaped 
the corporate landscape. Among equity-based systems, stock option awards 
rapidly became an extended practice. With the stock market on the rise, gains 
from the exercise of those options and the holding of stock turned out to be 
increasingly important components of top managers’ income. The explosion in 
executive pay remains largely unabated, even in the aftermath of the 2007-08 
global financial crisis, as stock-based rewards are still a key component of the 
pay package. 
 
The extended bull market of the 1990s further levered stock option programs 
widely adopted by large companies –mostly in the U.S. but also in the U.K., 
Continental Europe and beyond- to yield unprecedented gains for option holders. 
Even when the bull market receded, and was eventually replaced by the global 
financial crisis that broke out in 2007-2008, most stock option plans remain in 
place and so is the debate around their contractual design. 
 
Despite aimed at better aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests, equity-
linked compensation could create opportunistic behavior where managers pursue 
personal interests at the expense of shareholders’. 
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One way to avoid such a threat would be by clearly laying down the purpose of 
the stock option plan: is it intended to give all employees stock in the company 
or rather some, namely executives? Does the company wish to promote long-term 
ownership or is it a one-time benefit? Is the plan meant to create employee 
ownership or is it simply an additional benefit? The answers to these questions 
would prove crucial to design truly incentive-alignment contracts, a first-order 
concern in corporate boardrooms over which this study expects to shed some 
light. 
 
The boundaries of this research are illustrated in the figure below, in an acid-test 
fashion: the study begins by revisiting modern corporate governance with a focus 
on compensation, narrows down the analysis to discuss executive compensation 
as a major governance mechanism and joins the debate around the design of stock 
option contracts. 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Figure 2 - Acid-test approach of the study 
                               Source:  Own elaboration 
 
 
5.   Literature Review, Research Gap and Research Questions Revisited 
The dilemma lying at the very heart of recent corporate scandals was first 
identified by Adam Smith in the 18th century, and further discussed by Berle and 
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Means in their seminal work ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’ 
(1932). They attribute the conflict of interest that leads to the so-called agency 
costs to the wide dispersion of shareholders that paves the way to increased 
managerial power. 
 
Yet the ultimate theoretical foundation of this study is provided by the 
contractual theory of the firm. The modern theory of the firm as a nexus of 
contracts originated in Ronald Coase’s (1937) insight that firms exist as less 
costly alternatives to market transactions. In a world of zero transaction costs, 
economic coordination would be achieved entirely by means of contracting 
among individuals in a free market. However, because of the costs of negotiating 
and enforcing contracts, some coordination can be achieved more cheaply 
through firms.  
 
This network of contracts is likely to give raise to conflicting interests. These 
conflicts, that arise when people engage in cooperative endeavors, are potentially 
due to self interests, as agency theory postulates (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The fiduciary duties embedded in this agency relationship link one party that 
owns the asset (the principal) to another (the agent) that should manage it in the 
principal’s best interest. Because such potential conflicts of interest cause 
problems and therefore losses to those involved, the parties themselves have a 
strong motivation to minimize these so-called agency costs. As pointed out by 
Jensen (1994), the conservation of value principle is the basic force that 
motivates both principal and agent to minimize the sum of the costs of writing 
and enforcing implicit and explicit contracts through monitoring and bonding.  
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This structure of principal and agent may be readily applied to model corporate 
relationships, clearly those of shareholders (principals) and managers (agents). 
Their misalignment of interests reaches its peak in large, publicly traded 
companies, where dispersed ownership leaves individual shareholders with only a 
fractional interest in the firm’s profits. In such companies, rational-apathy 
induces shareholders to loose monitoring of managers, on top of actually having 
limited opportunities to observe management’s actions. Under the assumption 
that monitoring is costly and imperfect, the agent has an incentive to consume 
perquisites so long as she owns less than 100 percent of the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This is because she gets all or most of 
the benefits from the perquisite but bears potentially no cost –or only a fraction 
through her ownership claims, if any. Under this agency-driven incentive model, 
agency costs are mitigated when the risk-averse manager increases her 
stockholding, so she internalizes the cost of the perquisites consumed. Linking 
compensation to performance, for instance through stock option plans, is viewed 
as an efficient means to prompt managers to increase their share of ownership in 
the firm and deter the consumption of perquisites –as their costs are now 
internalized-, hence act as owners, aligned behind maximizing firm value. 
 
Executive compensation, when opting for equity-based formats, is likely to face a 
moral hazard problem: inducing managers to perform (‘problem of effort’) and 
align them with shareholders by taking more risk yet at the same time preventing 
them from taking too much risk. Indeed equity-based pay schemes have been 
recurrently blamed for prompting managers to excessive risk-taking. This study 
casts doubts on such a generic statement as it would imply that equity holders are 
largely risk prone by nature. Conversely, and in line with the purpose of this 
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research, inducing managers to take the right level of risk –as expected by 
shareholders, so as to create both firm and societal value- is largely a function of 
the design of compensation contracts. And equity-based pay –particularly stock 
options- could be instrumental in promoting effort so long as efficient incentive-
alignment mechanisms are built in the contract. So it is eventually a matter of 
design.  
 
Sepe (2011) has further criticized equity incentives arguing that they lead to 
problems of overinvestment. Asset substitution or overinvestment refers to the 
transfer of wealth from creditors to shareholders resulting from the undertaking 
of high-risk, high-return projects when the company has outstanding debt. The 
limited liability corporation leaves debtholders bearing most of the risk, while 
shareholders would reap the lion’s share of the benefits risking only up to the 
value of their equity. Share-based incentives, to the extent that they fuel 
managers’ risk appetite, would serve shareholders’ interests. Sepe further claims 
that, particularly following the recent financial crisis, credit providers are likely 
to discount such behavior and raise the cost of capital for all debtors, leading to 
an inefficient allocation of debt capital, harmful to society at large. While 
acknowledging that overinvestment is indeed a potential side effect embedded in 
equity-based compensation, it can be argued that such risk is contingent on the 
firm’s capital structure. Additionally, tools such as increased disclosure and/or 
covenants addressing the risks posed by dubious borrowers would help creditors 
discriminate and improve asset (debt) allocation, without penalizing all debtors –
and without demonizing equity incentives. Covenants may however come at a 
high opportunity cost for the firm as they might limit management discretion in 
the allocation of assets. Yet the choice of pay package is subject to multiple 
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variables across firms –hence company-specific- and certainly entails trade-offs 
–neither a ‘one size fits all’ nor such thing as a perfect compensation contract 
exist. It should also be noted that when fixed pay replaces equity-linked 
compensation, risk-averse managers are likely to become excessively 
conservative, which is as well harmful to the firm and eventually to society at 
large. 
 
Equity-linked compensation contracts are likely to materialize the pay-for-
performance aspiration that emerged as the optimal response to the ‘effort 
problem’ and in turn as key mechanism for solving the manager-shareholder 
agency problem. When financial rewards are guaranteed –through salary and 
other forms of fixed compensation-, managers have no reason to bear the cost 
imposed by taking more effort. In contrast, when pay is anchored to successful 
firm performance, managers become as interested in profit maximization as 
shareholders –a situation that induces them to exert the optimal amount of effort 
(Sepe, 2011). 
 
The recent financial crisis has triggered a shift in focus in the executive 
compensation literature, from the problem of effort to the problem of risk. Yet 
inducing both effort and the optimal level of risk remain at the core of the pay 
setting process. This shift in the focal point of the literature should not 
compromise the preeminence of the principal-agent framework in capturing the 
need to align managers’ and shareholders’ incentives for the long run, a need 
equity-based labor contracts may well serve. Yet as stressed throughout this 
study –and extensively acknowledged by scholars and practitioners-, the problem 
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with diverging incentives is one of form –namely design- rather than level, of 
executive pay. 
  
5.1 The Finance Model of Corporate Governance 
This study follows the finance approach to corporate governance. In a Berle-
Means world where ownership is divorced from control, managers hired by 
owners might systematically make choices that are not in the latter’s best 
interests.  
 
In this model, the central problem in corporate governance is constructing rules 
and incentives (that is, implicit or explicit 'contracts') to effectively align the 
behavior of managers (agents) with the preferences of principals (owners).  
 
The finance view of what is wrong with the governance system holds that 
shareholders do not have enough control or influence over management and as a 
result companies underperform in value creation –to shareholders and 
stakeholders at large-, while executives enjoy lavish perquisites.  
 
Managers may have significant incentives to act contrary to the interests of 
owners in ways that are more complicated than simple greed. For example, 
owners can diversify their personal risk by buying stock in several firms across 
several different industries. Managers, whose income depends heavily on the 
performance of a specific firm in a specific industry, cannot so easily diversify 
their risk. Consequently, managers may naturally be more conservative and less 
risk-taking in their actions than owners might like –see Gervais, Heaton and 
Odean (2003) in section 4.3 above.  
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According to the finance view of corporate governance, solving these and other 
agency problems requires adopting appropriate incentive systems. The finance 
model is rooted in the separation of ownership and control and relies on the 
explanatory power of agency theory. A critical review of such a conceptual 
framework follows.  
 
5.2 Reflecting on the separation of ownership and control 
  
Diffuse ownership is admittedly the outcome of a natural economic evolution. 
Even though owners would prefer to manage their own ventures and reap the 
maximum utility for themselves, enterprises often grow beyond the means of a 
single owner. The separation of ownership and control is thus the dominant 
feature of the modern corporation. 
Although separation of ownership and control is currently in the spotlight, it is 
arguably functional, as it allows skilled managers without capital to run the firm 
in lieu of owners that may lack those managerial skills. 
 
The massive disassociation of wealth from active management peaks in the 
publicly held company and is turning corporate governance on its head: 
stockholders, the owners, appear to become powerless (Wells, 2010). The 
paradox in the public corporation is that stockholder activism is of diminishing 
impact as the number of shareholders increases. Because of atomization, an 
active shareholder cannot capture all of the gain from becoming involved, 
monitoring performance or even sitting on the board of directors. Such a 
shareholder would incur the costs but split the gains, causing other fragmented 
shareholders to rationally forgo involvement. In the language of modern 
Pablo Collazzo Yelpo                                                                                                        
 
33
                                  Modeling Stock Option Contracts – Evidence from Spain 
 
 
economics, there is a collective action problem among shareholders –despite the 
potential gains to shareholders as a group, it is rational for each stockholder, 
when acting alone, to do nothing, because each would get only a fraction of the 
gain, which accrues to the firm and all stockholders. As a result, corporate wealth 
is likely to be held as a ‘passive’ investment, tempting managers to divert and 
pursue their own interests. 
 
In spite of fragmented ownership problems causing a shift of power to top 
management at the expense of shareholders, the survival of the public firm as an 
organizational form is not threatened. Firms with dispersed shareholders have 
survived because organizations have adapted, solving enough of the governance 
problems of the large corporation structures that technology and capital needs 
created. The advantages of economies of scale and professionalized management 
are likely to offset those organizational costs should managerial discretion be 
less than absolute. To achieve that goal, incentive contracting should be in place 
to narrow the gap between managers’ and shareholders’ aims. Alternatively, 
competition –in product markets, managerial labor costs, and capital markets- are 
likely to reduce the severity of occasional managerial opportunistic behavior. 
Hostile takeovers, proxy contests and the very threat of each further discipline 
managers. Yet fixing such prospective deviations internally –and ex ante- should 
be preferred –and cost-effective for all involved- to an ex post market-driven 
response. Managerial incentive compensation, materialized in the design of the 
labor contract, may turn out to be an effective tool to mitigate principal-agent 
problems. 
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The core hypothesis in the separation of ownership and control literature is then 
that profitability is a positive function of ownership concentration by obviating 
the divergence of interests between self-dealing managers and value-maximizing 
owners (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). One way to achieve managerial 
ownership –and therefore bypass this conflict- is granting employee stock 
options. Additionally, stock options have a non-trivial time effect embedded, as 
deferred vesting potentially stretches that bonding feature of managerial 
ownership into the future. 
 
5.3 Agency theory: origins, assumptions and limits 
 
As previously stated, the modern corporation typically has multiple owners, each 
aiming at maximizing her investment in the enterprise. 
 
In the agency framework, owners become principals when they contract with 
managers to run their firms for them. As an agent of the principal, a manager has 
a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder utility. However, executives might 
accept agent status on grounds of potential opportunities to maximize their own 
utility (Roe, 1994). 
 
The logic underlying agency theory is that of a rational actor who seeks to 
maximize his or her individual utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Both agents 
and principals seek to receive as much possible utility with the least possible 
expenditure. 
 
If the utility functions of self-serving agents and principals coincide, there is no 
agency problem; both agents and principals enjoy increases in their individual 
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utility. Agency costs are incurred by the principals when the interests of 
principals and agents diverge, because given the opportunity, agents would 
rationally maximize their own utility at the expense of the principals’. The 
chance that agents do not share the same interests and utility choices as their 
principals is substantial. According to agency theory, it is difficult for principals 
to know ex ante which agent would self-serve, and so it is prudent for principals 
to limit potential losses to their utility (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Because the unit of analysis is the contract governing the relationship between 
the principal and the agent, the focus of the theory is on determining the most 
efficient contract governing such relationship, given assumptions about people 
(e.g. self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), organizations (e.g. goal 
conflict among members), and information (e.g. information asymmetry between 
principal and agent). Specifically, the question becomes: is a behavior-oriented 
contract (e.g. fixed salaries, hierarchical governance) more efficient than an 
outcome-oriented contract (e.g. commissions, stock options)? 
 
From its roots in information economics, agency theory has developed along two 
lines: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983). The two streams share a 
common unit of analysis: the contract between the principal and the agent. They 
also share common assumptions about people, organizations and information. 
They basically differ in their choice of dependent variable and style.  
 
5.3.1 Positivist Agency Theory 
Positivist researchers focus on identifying situations in which principal and agent 
are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance 
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mechanisms that limit the agent’s self-serving behavior. Jensen (1983) described 
this interest as “why certain contractual relations arise”. The dominant 
proposition developed by the positivist stream is that outcome-based contracts 
are effective in curbing agent opportunism. The argument is that such contracts 
align the preferences of agents with those of principals because the rewards for 
both depend on the same actions and, therefore, the conflicts of interest between 
principal and agent are reduced. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
described how increasing the firm ownership of managers decreases managerial 
opportunism.  
 
4.3.2 Principal-Agent approach 
Positivist theory identifies various contract alternatives, and principal-agent 
theory indicates which contract is the most efficient under varying levels of 
outcome uncertainty, risk-aversion, information and other relevant variables.  
The focus of the principal-agent literature is on determining the optimal contract, 
behavior versus outcome. The simple model assumes goal conflict between 
principal and agent, an easily measured outcome, and an agent who is more risk-
averse than the principal. As stated earlier, the argument behind a more risk-
averse agent is that agents, who are unable to diversify their employment, are 
likely to be risk-averse, and principals, who are capable of diversifying their 
investments, are likely to be risk-neutral.  
 
In case of complete information –the principal knows what the agent has done-, a 
contract that is based on behavior is most efficient. An outcome-based contract 
would then needlessly transfer risk to the agent, who is assumed to be more risk-
averse than the principal.  
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If the principal does not know exactly what the agent does, two aspects of the 
agency problem may surface. Moral hazard refers to the lack of effort on the part 
of the agent. Adverse selection refers to the misrepresentation of ability by the 
agent, misleading the principal. In the case of unobservable behavior, with 
potential moral hazard or adverse selection scenarios, the principal has two 
options. One is to discover the agent’s behavior by investing in information 
systems such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures, boards of directors, 
and additional layers of management. Such investments are set to reveal the 
agent’s behavior to the principal, and the situation reverts towards the complete 
information case. The other option is to contract on the outcomes of the agent’s 
behavior. Such an outcome-based contract motivates behavior by alignment of 
the agent’s preferences with those of the principal, but at the price of transferring 
risk to the agent.  
The heart of principal-agent theory is therefore the trade-off between (a) the cost 
of measuring behavior and (b) the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring 
risk to the agent. The choice of control mechanisms therefore emerges. If the 
internal control mechanisms –monitoring and incentive compensation- fail, more 
expensive, external control mechanisms –e.g. acquisitions, divestitures- might 
come into play to control self-serving managers. Because of the expense of the 
external control mechanisms to the principal’s utility, internal mechanisms are 
generally preferred (Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
 
Among those internal governance mechanisms, executive compensation plays a 
central role. If managers receive compensation that is subject to the successful 
completion of shareholder objectives (e.g. long-term rewards tied to firm 
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performance), they will be motivated to behave in a manner consistent with 
stockholders’ interests. Those incentive schemes are desirable when the agent has 
a significant informational advantage and monitoring proves either too costly or 
next to unfeasible. Such is often the case in the large (listed) corporation that 
issues stock options to align conflicting interests. 
 
All in all, agency theory provides a solid rationale to explain relationships where 
the parties’ interests can be brought into alignment through proper monitoring 
and a well-planned compensation system. Additional theories would be needed to 
explain other types of human behavior. A relevant alternative approach is that of 
stewardship theory, summarized below.  
 
5.4 Alternative Views on Corporate Governance and Executive Pay 
5.4.1 Agency Theory versus Stewardship Theory 
 
Agency theory is widely applied to understand the conflicts of interests that are 
likely to arise between principals and agents, the resulting potential problems of 
opportunism, and the mechanisms developed to contain it, such as supervision 
and incentives. However, organizational relationships might be more complex 
than those captured by agency theory. An alternative model of managerial 
motivation and behavior is stewardship theory, which is derived from 
psychological and sociological roots.  
 
5.4.2 Stewardship Theory 
 
Stewardship theory has its roots in psychology and sociology and was developed 
to examine situations in which executives, as stewards, are motivated to act in 
the best interests of their principals (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In stewardship 
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theory, the model of man is based on a steward whose behavior is ordered such 
that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviors have higher utility than 
individualistic, self-serving behaviors. Thus, even where the interests of the 
steward and the principal are not aligned, the steward places higher value on 
cooperation than defection, to put it in game theory terms. Because the steward 
perceives greater utility in cooperative outcomes and behaves accordingly, her 
behavior can be considered rational.  
 
Stewardship theorists assume a strong relationship between the success of the 
organization and the principal’s satisfaction. A steward maximizes shareholder 
value through firm performance, because, by so doing, the steward’s utility 
functions are maximized.  
 
This view does not imply that the steward lacks ambition or personal aspirations. 
The difference between the agent and the steward lies in how those aspirations 
are materialized. The steward realizes the trade-off between personal and 
organizational objectives and believes that by working towards organizational, 
collective ends, personal aspirations materialize. The steward’s opportunity set is 
therefore constrained by the perception that the utility gained from pro-
organizational behavior is higher than the utility that can be gained through 
individualistic, self-serving behavior. 
 
With stewardship arguably preferable to principal-agent, why is not there always 
a steward relationship rather than an agency relationship? The answer likely lies 
in the risks that principals are willing to assume. In the governance contract 
between owners and managers, owners must decide how much risk they are 
willing to assume with their wealth. Agency prescriptions can be viewed as the 
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necessary costs of insuring principal’s utility against the risks of managerial 
opportunism (Davis et al, 1997). 
 
5.4.3 The Choice between Agency and Stewardship Relationships 
 
Such a choice is similar to the decision posed by the prisoner’s dilemma (Davis 
et al., 1997). First, it is a decision made by both parties to the relationship. The 
psychological characteristics of each party predispose each individual to make a 
particular choice. Second, the situational characteristics have an influence on the 
choice. The management philosophy and cultural background of each party may 
also play a significant role in their preferences. Finally, the expectation that each 
party has of the other will influence the choice between agency and stewardship.  
 
Davis at al. (1997) illustrate the nature of the dilemma in the figure below. When 
both the principal and the manager choose an agency relationship, the result is a 
true principal-agent relationship (1) that is likely to meet the expectations of 
each. When both principal and manager choose a steward relationship, the result 
is a true principal-steward relationship (4) that is designed to maximize the 
potential performance of the group. The dilemma occurs when the parties make 
different choices. If the principal chooses an agency relationship and the manager 
chooses a steward one (3), the result is likely to be a frustrated manager who 
feels betrayed by the principal. When stewards are controlled as if they were 
agents, they cannot enjoy the type of internal rewards they desire (e.g. growth, 
achievement or self-actualization), and as a result, they may engage in anti-
organizational behaviors. Finally, if the principal chooses a steward relationship 
and the manager an agency relationship (2), the manager acts opportunistically 
and takes advantage of the principal. 
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                 Figure 3 – Principal-Manager choice model  
                       
                  Source: Davis et al. (1997) 
          
 
It should be noted that the choice of agency versus stewardship relationships is 
likely to evolve over time. Increased trust may lead to a stewardship relationship 
whereas if one party is betrayed, the inevitable progression of the relationship is 
towards an agency model. 
 
Although the highest joint utility is in the steward-steward relationship, the least 
risk of betrayal (losses) is in the agent-agent relationship, in which both parties 
choose the agency framework. A likely conclusion of the above matrix is that 
when each party has an individualistic orientation –which is the dominant feature 
in the Spanish large caps sampled in this study-, the best choice (regardless of 
the choice of the other party) is an agency relationship. Both this model of choice 
and the alternative based on determinism (managers are predisposed to self-
serve) point at agency relationships as most likely drivers of compensation 
contracts. 
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5.4.4 Agency Theory and Transaction Cost 
Eisenhard (1988) draws a meaningful parallelism between agency theory and 
transaction cost theory, pointing at the noteworthy similarities the former has 
with the transaction cost organizational perspective. They both share assumptions 
of self-interest and bounded rationality, along with similar dependent variables, 
that is, hierarchies roughly correspond to behavior-based contracts, and markets 
correspond to outcome-based contracts. However, the two theories arise from 
different traditions in economics. Transaction cost is concerned with 
organizational boundaries, whereas in agency theory the contract between 
cooperating parties, regardless of boundaries, is highlighted. Yet the most 
important difference is that each theory includes unique independent variables. In 
transaction cost theory these are asset specificity and small numbers bargaining. 
In agency theory they are the risk attitudes of the principal and agent, outcome 
uncertainty, and information. Thus, the two theories share a similar economic 
root but each has its own focus and unique independent variables. 
5.4.5 Agency Theory vs. Stakeholder Theory: No Need to Fight 
This study shares the premise that corporations do not exist solely to provide 
returns to shareholders. They are to serve a larger purpose. Larger is indeed the 
proper way to illustrate the co-existence of the idea that corporations should be 
managed in the public interest alongside the economic purpose of the firm, in 
line with the ‘shared value’ proposition developed by Porter and Kramer (2011). 
The ‘shared value’ construct implies a re-definition of the concept of value 
altogether, to be understood as the combination of economic and social value, 
rather than the realization of one at the expense of the other. When the firm fails 
to meet the needs and expectations of its wider set of stakeholders –beyond 
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shareholders-, its legitimacy and acceptance in the community –often referred to 
as ‘social license to operate’- is at risk and so the very continuity of its business. 
So listening to –and meeting- stakeholders’ expectations becomes the ultimate 
means to serve shareholders and optimizing firm value in the long run. Hence 
both stakeholder and shareholder value are equally legitimate and desirable goals 
and as such, should drive corporate strategy.  
 
Such rationale could be extended to argue for a peaceful co-existence between 
agency and stakeholder theories, on grounds of complementary approaches. It is 
undeniable that the objectives of the company should be attained by balancing 
out the often conflicting claims of various stakeholders in the firm -managers, 
workers, stockholders, suppliers, vendors (Ansoff, 1965). Those different 
stakeholders are linked to the firm through multiple implicit and explicit 
contracts. According to Charkham (1992) a distinction can be drawn between 
contractual and community stakeholders, as depicted below: 
 
     Contractual stakeholders Community stakeholders 
Shareholders Consumers 
Employees Regulators 
Customers Government 
Distributors Pressure Groups 
Suppliers The media 
Lenders Local communities 
     
Table 1 - Contractual and community stakeholders  
Source:  Charkham (1992) 
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Agency theory in turn, points at a much more focused scenario. Within the set of 
contractual stakeholders, agency theory would target the fiduciary relationship 
arising from granting control rights over corporate assets. So the explanatory 
power of agency theory presupposes the existence of someone that owns the asset 
(the ‘principal’) and someone that is granted control over such asset (the 
‘agent’), bound by a fiduciary obligation to the former. An accounting insight is 
likely to make the point clearer. The left-hand side of the balance sheet displays 
the firm’s investments (corporate assets), that are financed by debt- and equity-
holders accounted for in the right-hand side. The latter are the ‘principals’, that 
enter into different contractual agreements with managers (the ‘agents’) when 
delegating control over the firm’s assets. Following the stakeholder view of the 
firm, ‘principals’ and ‘agents’ are stakeholders. But certainly not all stakeholders 
bear property or cash-flow rights over corporate assets –and are therefore in a 
position to grant control rights over them.  
 
The dynamics arising from the co-existence of property and control rights over 
corporate assets are agency theory’s arena. By zooming in on the potential 
conflict of interest to arise between owners and managers, agency theory claims a 
much narrower focus than that of stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory has a 
much broader scope, involving all constituencies that have an interest in the firm. 
Within those, agency theory focuses on a particular sub-set of stakeholders: those 
that own corporate assets, relative to those to whom control rights over such 
assets are delegated. The potentially conflicting interests arising between these 
two groups of stakeholders are agency theory’s concern. 
 
 
 
Pablo Collazzo Yelpo                                                                                                        
 
45
                                  Modeling Stock Option Contracts – Evidence from Spain 
 
 
5.5 Agency Theory Applied to Executive Compensation 
 
The choice of compensation mix emerges then as a remedy for the agency costs 
generated by the misalignment of management’s and shareholders’ interests in 
the dispersed ownership company. Contract design and the pay-setting process 
aimed at fixing agency problems are explained by two at times diverging, at 
times complementary approaches: ‘optimal contracting’ and ‘managerial power’. 
 
Bebchuk et al (2002) provide a comprehensive and critical review of the 
executive compensation landscape, bridging theory and practice. They point at 
‘optimal contracting’ as the dominant theory in the executive pay literature. 
Under this approach, executive compensation practices in large, listed companies 
are viewed as being designed to minimize agency costs arising in the relationship 
between executives (agents) and shareholders (principals). To bridge the gap 
between ownership and control, equity-based compensation –for instance a stock 
option plan- is granted to reduce the moral hazard problem coming from 
executives owing too little of the firm they manage. 
 
Another perspective into the study of executive compensation presented by 
Bebchuk et al (2002) is the ‘managerial power’ approach, which focuses on the 
role of managers in shaping executive pay practices. Evidence suggests that 
executive compensation is significantly influenced by managerial power and by 
managers’ interest in extracting rents.  
 
5.5.1 More on Optimal Contracting and Managerial Power 
 
The tensions between optimal contracting and managerial power in the design of 
executive pay are extensively discussed by Bebckuk et al (2002) and more 
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precisely in the context of agency theory by Bebchuk and Fried (2003). One 
important building block of the managerial power approach is that of the 
‘outrage’ costs and constraints. Outrage might cause embarrassment or 
reputational harm to directors and managers. Executives can exert influence on 
their own pay, but that does not imply an unlimited ability to do so. Although the 
need for board approval and the presence of market forces cannot be expected all 
by themselves to produce compensation arrangements consistent with optimal 
contracting, they can and usually do provide some constraints. For example, 
although a takeover threat may not be enough a warning to discourage managers 
from seeking to extract substantial rents, the concern about losing shareholder 
support in the event of a control contest places some limits on what managers and 
directors are willing to do. The tightness of the constraints managers and 
directors confront depends, in part, on the outrage, if any, expected to be 
generated by a particular compensation arrangement.  
 
The more outrage a compensation arrangement might generate, the more reluctant 
directors will be to approve the arrangement, and the more hesitant managers 
would be to propose it to begin with. Thus, whether a compensation arrangement 
that is favorable to executives but sub-optimal for shareholders is adopted would 
depend on how the arrangement is perceived by outsiders and, in particular, on 
how much outrage (if any) it can be expected to arise.  
 
Moreover, outrage has recently become a matter of broader concern, given not 
only the extended public scrutiny over executive pay but particularly the passing 
of ‘say on pay’ regulation –Ley 31/2014 modifying the LSC in Spain, Dodd-
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Frank Act in the U.S., as briefly referred to on page 15 and further discussed in 
Section 10. 
 
The potential significance of outrage costs explains the importance of 
‘camouflage’ –a second building block of the managerial power approach. 
Because outrage arising from outsiders’ recognition of significant rent extraction 
provides a possible check on managers’ power to extract rent, managers have an 
incentive to obscure and legitimize – or, more generally, to camouflage- their 
extraction of rents. Indeed, even the extensive use of compensation consultants, 
which could be viewed under the optimal contracting approach as an effort to 
design the most efficient incentive scheme, could be seen as a means of 
justifying and legitimizing pay under the managerial power approach. This 
concept of camouflage has indeed proven itself relevant in explaining many of 
the patterns and puzzles found in the design and management of the pay setting 
process. 
 
5.5.2 The Incentive-Alignment Paradigm 
 
Attention has been increasingly drawn on the low correlation between pay and 
performance. Compensation that grows faster than performance reveals its failure 
as an incentive-alignment tool. The whole curve that relates compensation to 
performance should be revisited -it is about a steeper curve, yet as close as 
possible to a 45 degree slope.   
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           Figure 4 – Pay for performance: expected relationship  
                     Source:  Own elaboration 
 
Pay for performance is a repeated cliché in boardrooms, still easier said than 
done. The reason that is likely to account for such recurrent failure is that 
companies seldom look at the historical relationship between executive pay and 
corporate performance, along with its projected future relationship adjusting for 
changes in compensation practices.  
 
The incentive-alignment paradigm hereby proposed rests on a straightforward and 
arguably efficient premise: executive pay should correlate with stock price net of 
market factors. One way to do so is to benchmark stock price appreciation over 
the long run against a peer group of companies that represents competitors for 
market, capital and executive talent. Such could be the overall yardstick, with 
specificities at company and market level factored in for justified deviations –
they are typically netted out of a construct like incentive-alignment, which is 
generic by nature. However, performance-based features such as making vesting 
and payoff contingent on achieving certain goals, or regulation of trading 
Performance 
Compensation 
45° 
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following option granting and exercising or a ban on repricing, are contractual 
steps designed to align incentives. 
 
The theoretical framework proposed, with particular emphasis on the ‘optimal 
contracting’ and ‘managerial power’ approaches, is confronted in section 10 with 
the empirical evidence gathered for Ibex 35 firms, so as to identify the extent to 
which incentive-alignment actually drives stock option design, and measure the 
impact of such alignment –or deviation- on risk-adjusted returns for the sampled 
firms.   
 
5.5.3 Interplay of ‘Optimal Contracting’ and ‘Managerial Power’ on the Choice 
of Strike Price 
 
Despite the widespread granting of at-the-money options, such choice of strike is 
unlikely to be optimal in terms of incentive alignment. An optimally designed 
option scheme would seek to provide risk-averse managers with the strongest 
cost-effective incentives to exert effort and make value-maximizing decisions. 
The optimal exercise price under such a scheme would depend on a multitude of 
factors that are likely to vary from executive to executive, from company to 
company, from industry to industry, and from time to time. Such factors might 
include the degree of managerial risk aversion (which in turn would be affected 
by the manager’s age and wealth), the investment choices available to the firm, 
the volatility of its stock price, the expected rate of inflation, and the length of 
the compensation contract, among other things. There is no reason to expect a 
‘one size fits all’ –that is, that the same exercise price would be optimal for all 
executives in the firm, let alone across firms and industries. 
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Similarly, it is highly unlikely that out-of-the-money options -options which 
exercise price is above the grant-date market price- are never optimal. As Hall 
(1999) argued, out-of-the-money options offer much higher pay-for-performance 
sensitivity per currency unit of expected value than conventional –at-the-money- 
options. He provides empirical evidence suggesting that giving managers out-of-
the-money options would boost firm value. The fact that options are almost 
uniformly issued at-the-money is thus difficult to explain following optimal 
contracting rationale –exogenous factors, such as the tax treatment of at-the-
money options, play a relevant role in favor of this choice of strike, yet beyond 
the proposed optimal contracting-managerial power interplay.  
 
The near-uniform use of at-the-money options is not puzzling, however, when 
examined under the managerial power approach. Given that executives benefit 
from lower exercise prices, they will wish to push those exercise prices as far 
down as possible without generating outrage. That dominant practice of granting 
at-the-money options provides itself some degree of justification for such a 
choice in the contract design process. Executives tend however to be cautious in 
pushing for in-the-money options, which might be regarded as a windfall and 
thereby generate outrage costs (Bebchuk et al, 2002). Because in-the-money 
options might thus be difficult or costly for managers to obtain, and at-the-money 
options are then their second-best, a uniform use of at-the-money options is 
consistent with the managerial power approach. 
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5.6 Research gap formalized and Research Questions revisited 
Multiple and insightful contributions have shaped the executive compensation 
landscape, with significant impact on both the direction of the academic debate 
and the choices made by firms in the design and implementation of pay packages.  
 
The widening gap between pay and performance, compounded by the more or less 
severe shrinking in corporate earnings that notably followed the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis and the massive exposure of such gap in the media, have 
arguably only marginaly led to increased alignment between executive pay and 
the actual contribution of management to value creation for the firm. 
Convergence is somehow more noticeable in academia, as scholars from multiple 
disciplines –from corporate governance, to human resources, to organization 
behavior, to finance, to strategy- have united their voices to unveil and condem 
that pay-peformance mismatch. Partially challenged by the evidence put forward 
by academics and more so by the media, regulators followed, at times enforcing 
and others advocating for practices that induce convergence –such as ‘say on 
pay’ requirements- or otherwise for metrics that would disclose the divergence –
such as the CEO pay ratio. Assuming academia, media and regulators have not 
given up on their efforts, the limited progress so far achieved, as suggested by 
the largely marginal drop in corporate pay scandals, points at the need to 
intensify the advocacy –pay is at the end of the day a discretionary choice of the 
firm, and there is so much that the ‘comply or explain’ governance principle may 
do in terms of outrage. While the fundamentals on the effectiveness and 
efficiency gains of pay-performance sensitivity as means-end and input-output 
have been widely elaborated on theoretical grounds, there seems to be a need to 
bring forward more empirical evidence to bridge theory and practice and more 
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persuasively induce firms to ‘walk the talk’ and implement pay schemes that help 
narrow the pay-performance divide. A complementary dimension of this gap in 
the compensation literature has to do more specifically with the relatively biased 
nature of most studies on stock options, which tend to look at outcomes, that is at 
how and why ill-designed option contracts are likely to bring pay and 
performance further appart, rather than at exploring opportunities to improve the 
contracts by unveiling significant correlations between the choice of design and 
risk-adjusted returns. Those potential benefits from increased alignment are more 
readily observable in listed companies, bound to file and disclose their executive 
compensation arrangements, and signaling outcome through stock market prices. 
This study addresses the above mentioned gap and leverages on the disclosure 
requirements and observable stock prices of all the firms included in the Spanish 
Ibex 35 stock market index over a 18-year time window (1995-2013), conducting 
a longitudinal study on the stock option contract design of all firms in the index 
granting such benefit over that timeframe –the rationale for the choice of this 
time window is addressed in the data collection section (7). As noted, the 
emphasis is placed on identifying potential relationships between contract design 
and improved risk-adjusted returns. Additionally, by looking at the Spanish case, 
this research aims at providing evidence-based findings on stock option practices 
outside the US, attempting to further narrow the gap between the dominant US-
based literature on compensation and the rest, particularly when it comes to 
Continental Europe pay practices.  
 
This many-sided gap, as elaborated above, is addressed by the research questions 
outlined in section 2. The combined analysis of the public filings of stock option 
granting Ibex 35 firms over the selected period, along with their financial 
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performance as measured by their stock price trajectory, will lead to potential 
answers to the driving question of this study, i.e. the extent to which Ibex 35 
stock option contracts effectively aling shareholders’ and executives’ incentives. 
The effectiveness of those incentive-alignment mechanisms built in the 
compensation contracts are assessed through the lens of the potential drivers that 
explain the choices of design, being them optimal contracting, managerial power 
(towards rent extracting) or a combination of both. The underlying rationale of 
the complementary research question as noted in section 2, is a positive 
relationship between optimal contracting and incentive alignment, and a negative 
one if the contract is shaped by managerial power.  
 
The research questions are hereby restated and operationalized into a set of 
hypotheses. The main research question: 
- How effectively do Ibex 35 stock option contracts aling shareholders’ and 
executives’ incentives? 
is translated into the following hypothesis, to be tested in the analytical chapter 
(section 9), as input to the modelling contribution of this study: 
H1: Stock option compensation positively impacts on risk-adjusted returns in the 
samped firms. 
 
The complementary research question, that ties back the empirical study to the 
relevant theories identified in the literature,  
- What mix of optimal contracting and managerial power can be identified in 
Ibex 35 stock option grants? 
is in turn developed into the following hypothesis: 
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H2: Optimal contracting design for the strike price, the vesting period, the 
maturity, the possibility of repricing and the restrictions on trade are likely to 
lead to increased risk-adjusting returns for the granting Ibex 35 firm. 
 
The above hypotheses, coupled with the research questions, are set to lead the 
discussion of the findings in section 9. In order to explore potential answers, the 
choice of methodology and methods are discussed next.  
 
6. Methodology  
The potential answers to the above research questions will come out of a 
thorough assessment of all stock option contracts granted by Ibex 35 firms over 
the specified time window. The contractual terms hereby assessed are those 
identified in the literature (Bebchuk et al, 2002; Hall and Murphy, 2002) and in 
managerial practice as shaping the value and pay-off of the option –strike price, 
vesting requirements, maturity, repricing and trading restrictions. The outcome of 
this assessment will be developed into a grading of all option contracts, past and 
current, that will in turn feed the independent variable of the relationship 
explored in this study, namely whether the design of the contract around the five 
terms above impacts on the firm’s risk-adjusted returns. The rationale and output 
of the grading scheme is presented in section 9. The sensitivy of the returns to 
the design of the contract is further developed in that section, guiding the 
discussion of the findings. Panel data analysis is conducted to identify the 
relationship, and potential causality, between contract design and risk-adjusted 
returns in the sampled firms. The expected contribution of this study largely lies 
in providing empirical evidence on the contract design-incentive alignment 
interplay for Ibex 35 firms, modeling a set of arguably optimal choices of the 
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five key terms enhancing the alignment of incentives between managers and 
shareholders.  
 
6.1 Stock Option Design 
Stock option plans are the umbrella contracts that govern stock options programs. 
Stock option agreements are the individual option grants, vesting schedules, and 
other employee-specific information. Option plans typically begin by stating 
their overall incentive-alignment purpose, namely to give employees a sense of 
ownership and to encourage them to stay with the company longer. The focal 
term is the strike price, which is mostly set at the fair market value of the stock –
often an average of the high and low trading prices for a particular day or over a 
longer period. Options cannot be transferred. Death, disability and retirement are 
cases of special treatment and allow for accelerated vesting and longer terms to 
exercise options. The number of shares available to grant should be clearly set in 
the stock option plan, as it has an impact on dilution.  
 
The potential gains for stock option beneficiaries are unlimited, in direct 
proportion, one to one with the appreciation of the underlying stock of the 
granting firm. The downside relates to the beneficiary’s concentration of risk on 
the employer –both her human and financial capital increasingly tied up to the 
firm’s stock. A proper assessment of the trade-offs for both the executive and the 
firm linked to the choice of the strike price, the vesting requirements, the time to 
expiration, the possibility of repricing and the trading restrictions following 
option exercise is likely to help shareholders and option holders balance out their 
benefits and risks. 
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6.2 Strike Price 
 
The strike or exercise price is the amount that has to be paid out to acquire the 
underlying stock within the time frame agreed upon in the contract. The in-the-
money vested option may indeed be settled by cashing-in the difference between 
the stock market price at the time of exercise and the strike price.  
 
Most stock options are conventional options that are issued at-the-money (the 
strike price is set equal to the market price at grant date) and this exercise price 
remains fixed over the entire option period. Such dominant practice has implied 
huge rewards for executives during the bull market that preceded the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, and has in turn raised a heated wave of criticism from active 
investors and society at large. Executives have been blamed for being 
shamelessly compensated even for underperforming –relative for instance to 
industry peers- as a result of the fixed exercise price construction of their 
options. The serious design weakness of at-the-money options is that any 
increase in the underlying stock price is potentially rewarded as positive 
performance.  
 
Therefore, the traditional, fixed-price option is arguably not an efficient 
compensation instrument, as it fails to reward only superior performers, and 
consequently may not provide the best incentives.  
 
Alternatively, by specifying a certain index or benchmark as strike price, it is 
indeed possible to obtain a better measure of positive performance and hence to 
reward truly superior performers while appropriately penalizing poor ones. The 
particular index could either be a broad market average, an index made out of a 
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peer group of competitors, or could even be narrowly defined from the stock 
price of a close competitor. The exercise price for an indexed option is not 
known at the time of grant, but rather tied to the specified moving benchmark. 
Indexed options would have value when the company’s stock price rises in excess 
of the index or decline less than its competitor(s) or overall market. By 
downwardly adjusting the exercise price of the option during a downturn in the 
industry, indexed options also remove pressure to reprice stock options –see 6.5 
below. 
 
Increasing pay-performance sensitivity should be the ultimate goal of 
compensation contracting. Not absolute performance, which might be the result 
of (market) factors beyond the executive’s control, but relative performance (to a 
market or industry benchmark), arising from firm-specific factors that make the 
stock outperform its peers out of the executive’s superior skills.  
 
Calls to abandon fixed-price, plain vanilla stock options are recurrent yet the 
adoption of relative-performance-based options remains rare. Before mandatory 
expensing, a less favorable accounting treatment (unlike conventional options, 
indexed options had to be expensed) was a heavy burden for such design. Once 
charging stock options to earnings became compulsory, management reluctance 
to forgo the ‘free lunch’ provided by traditional options –in a pay-setting process 
likely to be influenced by managerial power- still prevents relative-performance-
based compensation from advancing. 
 
The challenge is to isolate the return on equity from factors beyond the 
executive’s control. What remains –reflecting improvements in performance for 
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which executives are themselves responsible- should be compared to the 
achievements of their peers, so as to capture the real, distinctive value created by 
a particular manager. 
 
6.3 Vesting Period 
 
One of the critical success factors to align incentives when designing a stock 
option plan, is the choice of vesting schedule. Outlined in the stock option 
agreement, it refers to the amount of time that should elapse before employees 
could exercise their stock options. 
 
Vesting is either set up as ‘cliff’, that is, a single date on which options become 
fully vested all at once after a specified period (usually from as short as six 
months from granting to as long as five years), or ‘graded’, i.e. options vest 
gradually over time (it generally spreads over a longer period even if percentage 
increments occur sooner). Additionally, firms occasionally offer new employees 
immediate vesting as a type of sign-in bonus. Others structure their plans so that 
options vest over a period of years, a practice known in the literature as ‘golden 
handcuffs’, as they create an incentive for employees to remain with the 
company. Vesting could also be contingent on performance, as firms may choose 
to reward employees with performance-based stock options, which vest –often 
incrementally- when certain performance goals are met.  
 
The choice of vesting schedule would largely depend on the ultimate goal of the 
stock option plan: to attract, motivate, reward or retain employees, with vesting 
times theoretically increasing as firms go from attracting to retaining employees.  
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Table 2 presents an example of vesting according to tenure with the firm, typical 
of high-tech companies: 
    
    Tenure with the firm 
Accumulated Vesting 
 (e.g a high-tech company) 
Less than six months 0 % 
Six months 25 % 
Each month thereafter 2 % more 
End of year 1 37 % 
End of year 2 61 % 
End of year 3 85 % 
Eighth month of year 4 100 % 
    
            Table 2 - Illustration of a vesting schedule  
              Source:  www.mystockoptions.com 
 
Once vested, the option holder can typically choose when to exercise her options, 
up to expiration. If granted options through different plans, she can choose which 
vested options to exercise, regardless of the order in which they were granted.  
 
Performance-based option plans remain conducive to align incentives, as they 
link vesting to performance measures. Some plans allow options to vest when 
earnings per share reach a given percentage annual growth. Others set 
incremental vesting schedules for gradual increases in the stock price. The 
preferred formula seems to follow a carrot-stick scheme: vesting is accelerated 
when there is superior performance or else set closer to option maturity. 
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Employees who terminate their employment are entitled to receive the vested 
portion of their options. Otherwise, the vested portion is received upon 
retirement, disability or death. Once vested options are exercised, the employee 
becomes shareholder, entitled to full economic and political rights, as outlined in 
table 3 below: 
 
        Holder of 
unvested 
options 
Holder of 
vested options 
(not exercised) 
Shareholder 
(exercised 
options) 
Gain if stock  
price increases NO YES* YES 
Lose if stock  
price decreases NO NO YES 
Vote NO NO YES 
Earn dividends NO NO YES 
 
        *not yet cashed        
 
         Table 3 - Shareholders vs. Option holders          
         Source:  Own elaboration 
 
6.4 Option Maturity 
 
Options have an expiration date: they can be exercised starting on a certain date 
and ending on a certain date. If they are not exercised during that period, the 
option holder forgoes the right they confer. And if the employee leaves the 
company, she can only exercise her vested options, giving up any future vesting. 
There are often special rules for terminated and retired employees, as well as in 
the event of disability or death. Such circumstances typically accelerate both 
vesting and expiration.  
 
Contract maturity is often set as early as two years from granting to as long as 
ten years. In Spain, stock option plans tend to lean towards shorter maturities. 
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Time to maturity along with the rationale for different expiration choices are 
further discussed in the data analysis section.  
 
Longer terms may constrain the firm’s ability to hedge the stock option grant. 
Although plans occasionally include some creative financial engineering to cover 
the call option written to employees, the longer the maturity the more difficult 
the hedging, as the uncertainty embedded in longer-term options makes risk 
transferring (hedging) less likely. 
 
On top of their intrinsic value (the difference between the market price of the 
underlying stock and the strike price), options accrue additional value (time 
value) positively correlated to market volatility and maturity. For the holder of a 
financial option, the higher the volatility and the longer the time to expiration, 
the higher the value of the option, given its increased likelihood to end up ‘in-
the-money’ for a profit. The specific nature of stock options -such as non-
transferability and vesting terms- makes the conventional value drivers used in 
option pricing models less suitable -yet still largely applied to estimate their 
value.  
 
The Board usually retains the right to make amendments to the plan -including 
termination- but such actions would never affect rights attached to options 
already granted. 
 
Granting stock options with shorter maturity could help avoid repricing. Other 
things constant, option value increases as time to maturity increases, as there is 
more time value –time for the option to move into (or deeper into) the money, as 
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noted above. Such correlation between maturity and option value applies to 
financial options, yet a similar logic drives stock options value –even after 
adjusting for those special features that tell them apart. Unlike financial option 
holders that, once the intrinsic value of their options becomes negative, they hold 
on to the option’s time value, executives granted stock options might exert 
whatever degree of managerial power they may have in order to recover that 
intrinsic value by way of having their options repriced. Contingent on the 
volatility of the underlying asset –the company stock-, longer maturities are more 
likely to drive stock options underwater. Hence it can be argued that shorter 
maturities would benefit the firm by lowering its exposure to repricing demands. 
And when shorter maturities are combined with subsequent grants, the value of 
the stock option for the executive is enhanced as well.  
 
Thus, rather than granting options with a ten-year term, a shorter, say a five-year 
term, may prove better. Then, if underwater, earlier expiration would leave room 
for new grants, so as to boost the stock option motivational driver. Shorter 
maturity coupled with regular granting should be preferred to highly 
controversial repricing practices, further discussed below.  
 
6.5 Option Repricing 
 
Repricing -the practice of lowering the exercise price, usually to the current 
market value- on underwater options has long been under attack from accounting 
rule makers and a growing share of institutional investors. An underwater option 
is one in which the strike price exceeds the current market price of the 
company’s stock. Should holders of underwater options be willing to buy the 
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stock, they would be better off buying it in the open market than by exercising 
their options.  
 
A significant price drop over a sustained period of time would be a typical 
repricing trigger. Companies that rely heavily on stock options are likely to deal 
with underwater options. The answer to the diminished incentive alignment 
power of such options ranges from waiting out in hopes of a price recovery, 
repricing them, granting new options or offering cash-bonus arrangements. 
 
6.5.1 Wait Out 
 
Holding on to temporary underwater options is the alternative that more closely 
matches stock option intuition. Historically, companies have adjusted underwater 
options out of the concern that employees holding those options would no longer 
be tied to the company and likely to seek other opportunities in the market. But 
in today’s marketplace, with companies navigating through the aftermath of the 
2007-2008 crisis, when every other day the media reports yet another downsizing 
or the next start-up shuts down, a tighter labor market has likely relieved some of 
the pressure on firms to immediately restore value to underwater options. 
 
6.5.2 Repricing 
 
In a repricing the strike price is amended to reduce it to the current market value, 
or alternatively, the underwater option is canceled and a new stock option is 
granted with an option price equal to the current market value.  
 
6.5.3 Granting New Options 
 
Granting new options altogether –without calling off the original ones- might be 
the simplest solution. Yet a number of issues should be pondered, with 
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shareholder dilution and depletion of the plan’s share reserve topping the list. 
Besides, if the stock price does recover, optionees would end up 
overcompensated by benefiting from both plans.   
 
6.5.4 Cashing Out 
 
Another alternative to eliminate underwater options is to give employees a cash 
settlement in exchange for the options, effectively canceling the out-of-the-
money grants. If the company is concerned about the dilution created by writing 
new options, providing a cash settlement to employees may be an attractive 
substitute. Conversely, if cash flow is an issue for the company, this alternative 
may be less desirable. 
 
Indeed, choices other than holding on to the underwater grant violate the very 
basic rationale of stock options. The concept of a stock option is very 
straightforward: the employee has unlimited upside gains out of the appreciation 
of the underlying –her company stock- and virtually no downside –no premium 
was paid, other than a potential opportunity cost from having this compensation 
scheme in the pay package. This is the simple essence of a stock option: the 
interests of shareholders and employees are directly linked. 
 
Stock options repricing turns this logic upside down. The interests of employees 
are placed ahead of the interests of shareholders. No one would ever consider 
canceling and reissuing stock options when the price has risen. They only occur 
when the price has fallen. A stock option is a contract between shareholders and 
employees that allows the latter to share in future increases in company value. 
Pablo Collazzo Yelpo                                                                                                        
 
65
                                  Modeling Stock Option Contracts – Evidence from Spain 
 
 
An option repricing is a unilateral change in the terms of that contract that 
benefits employees at the expense of shareholders. 
 
If executives have benefited from stock price increases in a bullish stock market, 
why should they be protected from falling stock prices when the reason for the 
decline might well be poor earnings performance –for which management must 
bear primary responsibility? In conventional options, i.e. with a fixed strike 
price, there is no protection against bear markets that drag the firm’s share price 
down. The only way for the optionee to be potentially insulated against a market-
driven stock price decline would come from the indexed design, in which even a 
price drop of the firm’s stock is to be rewarded provided that drop is less than 
the movable index –typically set a either a single or a pool of competitors- 
chosen as strike.   
 
Companies that reprice their options often justify it on the need to restore the 
incentive and retention power of such grants, which became worthless as the 
market value dropped below the strike price. However, underwater options, just 
as premium-priced ones, have considerable value depending among other factors 
on their remaining time to maturity, so just because they may be underwater at 
one point in time, does not mean such options are worthless. As stated earlier, 
underwater refers to options carrying negative intrinsic value, yet all options 
retain time value before expiration, priced to the probability of their ending up 
(deeper) in-the-money.  
 
Besides, and along the arguments raised in 6.1.3 on shorter maturities, a company 
could restore the retention and incentive potential of stock options by offering 
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regular (e.g. annual) grants, instead of a single plan that may end up underwater 
over time. 
 
In sum, repricing violates the underlying logic of stock options and jeopardizes 
the alignment of interests between employees and shareholders.  
 
6.6 Trading Restrictions 
 
Stock option design is typically a target of widespread criticism. When value is 
set to provide managers with incentives, granting firms should make sure that 
proper limits are in place to prevent managers from unwinding them.  
 
Although the optionee cannot exercise her call option until the vesting period is 
over, the compensation contract might preclude the employee from cashing out 
vested options –that is, from exercising the options and right away selling the 
acquired shares. Such a burden would extend the sought after incentive-
alignment effect into the future. Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that managers 
exercise many of their options well before expiration, and promptly sell most of 
the shares acquired through the exercise of those options.  
 
An optimal contract might also prohibit managers receiving options from 
weakening (if not eliminating) the incentive effects of the grant by selling an 
equivalent number of shares already owned by them, taking short positions on the 
stock or acquiring puts on the company’s shares. Trading on the stock right after 
option granting or exercising is known as flipping the option. Conversely, such 
constraints could excessively curb the manager’s private portfolio choices. 
Preventing the immediate sale of shares acquired from vested options would 
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therefore be more tolerable –and probably easier to trace. Explicit contractual 
burdens along with less favorable tax treatments could combine to discourage 
earlier disposal of option grants. 
 
Attempts to hedge exposure to firm-specific risk clash with the stock ownership 
culture that options intend to boost. Permitting executives to offload their 
positions in the short-run can lead to significant distortions in the way companies 
are managed. Compared to executives that are compelled to hold the shares 
longer, executives not banned from flipping the option might tend to make 
investment decisions biased in favor of short-term projects, and probably exert 
less effort after selling out their shares. The decline in shareholder value caused 
by such distortions is likely to exceed the extra rents executives reap from their 
freedom to offload options and shares.  
 
Two mutually exclusive views converge around trading restrictions: 
shareholders’ that would like managers to act as owners for the long-run, and 
managers’ that claim full command of their private portfolios –vested options 
and shares acquired on option exercise are undoubtedly on the private wealth 
side. 
 
6.6.1 Just diversify? Probably too simple an answer 
 
Arguments acknowledging risk concentration are openly recognized by 
academics and practitioners. When human capital, current income and pension 
plan are heavily invested in the employer’s stock, unsystematic, company-
specific risk over-exposure is hard to deny. For concentrated risk, the answer 
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might be fairly simple: just diversify. Indeed, too simple a claim to hold when it 
comes to stock option design. 
 
While diversifying does meet executives’ needs, it has an opposite-sign effect on 
shareholders’ incentive-alignment purposes. Following the literature that points 
at the mismatch between stock option cost to employers and value to employees 
(Hall and Murphy, 2002), the argument can be extended to discuss the benefits 
for both sides arising from diversification. When the executive diversifies away 
by selling the stock following option exercise, she is cutting down on her 
perceived excessive unsystematic risk. Such trading closely fits modern portfolio 
theory.  
 
However, when the executive sells off her arguably overweighed holding of 
company stock, she is at the same time unraveling the incentive embedded in the 
option that aimed at knitting her wealth to the company’s for the long run. By 
managing her assets according to modern portfolio paradigms, the executive is 
trashing the incentive-alignment goal and almost destroying the value of the 
stock option for the shareholder.  
 
But imposing tight trading constraints alongside option granting is likely to be a 
heavy burden on the optionee. Potential tax liabilities and liquidity reasons stand 
out as convincing arguments for such trading not to be forbidden –if taxes are 
due on exercise, the trading ban may eventually pose a liquidity burden on the 
beneficiary.  
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A compromise to sort out those potentially conflicting preferences of 
shareholders and optionees could be to require a minimum holding period for the 
net shares acquired on the exercise of vested options. Net shares refer to the 
number of shares equal in value to the spread between market and strike prices 
times the options exercised, after withholding for taxes and exercising costs. If 
cash settlement is allowed, the optionee would be required to reinvest the net 
gain in the company’s shares, further tying her wealth to the firm’s. 
 
The choice of vesting period could yield comparable results. For shareholders, 
setting a longer vesting period would result in a comparable outcome in terms of 
carrying the alignment into the future. For this matter, and beyond tax and 
accounting treatments, shareholders could choose any combination of vesting and 
holding period. A three-year vesting coupled with a two-year minimum holding 
period for the shares acquired –assuming the option is exercised right after 
vesting- would be similar to a five-year vesting when it comes to inducing the 
manager to act as owner. Yet the optionee would not be quite as indifferent. As 
holder of unvested options the manager would not be able to profit from the 
political and economic rights (voting and dividends) from the shares that she 
would otherwise acquire –even if compelled to hold- upon exercise of vested 
options. 
 
No trading constraints translate into unlimited possibilities for the manager to 
unwind incentives built on the option while excessive burdens on trading may 
harm rather than motivate management. A balanced contract design would 
therefore prove critical for stock options to attain their incentive-alignment goal.  
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7. Data Collection 
This research draws on the triangulation of data collection and analysis, thereby 
ensuring reliability and internal and construct validity. Both qualitative and 
quantitative data are used. Public filings of the sampled companies, combined 
with a panel data analysis make for the methodological pillars of the study. 
Multiple sources of evidence are likely to diminish any propensity for bias. The 
basic proposition is to link all data collected to theory in an inductive process. 
 
The study is conducted on large, publicly traded Spanish firms. The proxy for 
those large, listed companies in Spain is the Ibex 35 stock market index. This 
index tracks the performance of a specific portfolio of the most liquid, large 
capitalization Spanish stocks.  
 
The choice of large capitalization stocks is due to the fact that it is indeed in 
those large publicly traded companies where dispersed ownership is often at its 
highest, that stock option plans are most likely adopted as a remedy for agency 
problems.  
 
Additionally, by observing the entire population of companies listed in the index, 
the usual burdens arising from sample selection and significance are bypassed. 
Inferential error caused by sampling error is eliminated since data are gathered 
from the whole population under study. 
 
An extensive set of data was collected, retrieving all stock option plans filed by 
the sampled firms with the Spanish stock market regulator (CNMV, Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores), from 1995 through 2013 (March), along with 
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their daily closing share prices, used as input to compute the risk-adjusted 
returns of those firms included in the Index that granted stock options over the 
selected time frame. As noted, the rationale for the choice of the time window 
relates to the incremental adoption of stock options by Ibex 35 firms in the mid-
90s, collecting a large number of observations through 2013 (March), in an 
attempt to blend a sizable yet contemporary data set for the inferential analysis. 
For the gap between the extensive data collection process and the submission 
date of this study, no material changes in the sampled firms’ stock option plans 
were identified.  
 
7.1 The sample 
As pointed out earlier, this study expects to shed light on the design of stock 
option plans in large capitalization firms, where such a compensation contract is 
most widely used. For that aim, average firm size in the sample is not considered 
binding. The observed companies share some distinctive features (boards not 
always independent of management and limited market for corporate control) that 
shape their corporate governance practices. Further discussion follows in section 
7.3 applying Gedajlovic and Shapiro’s (1998) model. 
 
Finally, even if there is some agreement in the literature (Gorman, 1986; Florin 
et al, 2010) that salaries for executives positively correlate to firm size -
traditionally measured using company revenues-, this study does not deal with 
the absolute monetary value of the executives’ salary but rather with its relative 
form, namely the weight of stock option compensation and specifically the 
contractual design of such plans.  
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7.2 The Ibex 35 Index 
 
An index is a statistical measure of the changes in a portfolio of assets 
representing a portion of the overall market. As it would be too difficult to track 
every single security trading in the market, a smaller sample representative of the 
whole market is taken. Most indexes –including the Ibex 35- weight components 
based on market capitalization. If a company’s market capitalization is 1.000 and 
the value of all stocks in the index is 100.000, then the company would be worth 
1 percent of the index.  
 
The Ibex 35 gathers the 35 most liquid stocks trading in the network of Spanish 
stock exchanges, called S.I.B.E. (Sistema de Interconexión Bursátil), over a given 
time frame. It is rebalanced every six months (control period) to make sure that 
all stocks included in the index meet liquidity and market capitalization 
requirements. 
 
The design and management of the Ibex 35 is carried out by Sociedad de Bolsas 
S.A., the firm that in turn manages the SIBE trading platform. For a stock to be 
added to the Ibex 35, its average market capitalization has to be higher than 0.30 
percent of the index’ market capitalization over the six month control period. 
Additionally, the stock needs to be traded in at least 1/3 of the sessions in those 
previous six months. The value of the index is made out of the closing trading 
prices of its components. Its base value was 3.000, as of December 29, 1989, 
even if the index was launched on January 1992. Adjustments are introduced 
when new shares are issued, on share buy-backs but not on dividend payments 
(Technical Regulations for the Composition and Calculation of the Sociedad de 
Bolsas S.A. Indexes, 2010). 
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In this study, data were collected for all firms that were at any time part of the 
Iber 35 index and granted stock options while listed in the index. By the cut-off 
date of the study (March 15th, 2013), the Ibex 35 only included 34 stocks, as 
Bankia was excluded from the index –yet it still listed in the general Mercado 
Continuo. Following that last update, the components of the index are listed 
below: 
 
 COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY 
Abengoa Energy/Environment/Infrastructures 
Arcelor Mittal Metal (Steel) 
Abertis Transport/Telecommunications 
Grupo ACS Infrastructures/Energy 
Acerinox Metal (Steel) 
Acciona Infrastructures 
Amadeus Technology/Travel 
BBVA Banking 
BankInter Banking 
BME Financial Services/Trading 
Caixabank Banking 
DIA Consumer Products (Retail) 
Endesa Energy 
Enagas Energy 
FCC Infrastructures/Transport 
Ferrovial Infrastructures/Transport 
Gas Natural Energy 
Grifols Health Care 
IAG Aviation 
Iberdrola Energy 
Indra Information Technology 
Inditex Textiles 
Mapfre Full Line Insurance 
Obrascón Infrastructures 
Banco Popular Banking 
REE Energy 
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Repsol Energy (Integrated Oil & Gas) 
Banco de Sabadell Banking 
Banco Santander Banking 
Sacyr Vallehermoso Infrastructures 
Telefonica Telecommunications 
Técnicas Reunidas  Infrastructures (Energy) 
Mediaset Media & Publicity 
Viscofan Consumer (Food) 
 
              
             Table 4 - Companies included in the IBEX 35 as of March 15th, 2013 
             Source:  Bolsa de Madrid 
 
7.3 On the sample – Common features 
 
Applying Gedajlovic and Shapiro’s (1998) analytical framework to the sample 
suggests Ibex 35 firms share a number of features that reinforce the rationale for 
this comparative study on executive compensation practices and specifically on 
stock option plans. Gedajlovic and Shapiro compare corporate governance across 
three distinctive features: shareholder activism, independence of the Board of 
Directors (BoDs) and market for corporate control.  
 
As far as shareholder activism, the Spanish model, reflected in our sampled 
firms, is characterized by a mix of relatively passive shareholders or what Roe 
(1994) calls ‘distant shareholders’ -a distinctive trait of large caps that comes 
with the dispersion of ownership-,  along with sizable, active blockholders –
usually institutional investors. Spanish banks –the most noticeable institutional 
investor in the nation’s largest corporations- usually seat on the board, as they 
hold significant equity positions in such companies. Their arguably closer 
monitoring power is nonetheless curtailed by a majority of CEOs serving as 
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Chairman of the Board (table 5 below), which is likely to inhibit independent 
oversight of management.  
 
Along the same lines and concerning board composition, even if every Ibex 35 
company has a majority of independent (non-executive) directors, such boards 
are not likely to be entirely independent of management. For BoDs to properly 
carry out their control duties, having a majority of independent directors means 
just about complying with current regulation that so requires. As long as the 
position of CEO and Chair are not split, BoDs’ independence would be seriously 
questioned. No matter how many independent directors there are on a board, that 
board is less likely to protect shareholder interests by providing independent 
oversight of the officers if the Chairman is also the CEO, which accounts for the 
highly debatable issue of CEO duality, extensively discussed in the literature 
(Fahlenbrach, 2009; Muslu, 2010). As shown in table 5 below, the bulk of our 
sampled companies have the roles of Chairman and CEO combined -18 relative to 
16, as computed by the cut-off date of the study (March 15, 2013).  
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Table 5 – Ibex 35 - BoDs independence  
     
Source:  Own elaboration, computed with data from the CNMV ,  as of the cut-off date (March 
15, 2013) 
 
Even if BoDs appear to be increasingly aware of the reputational risk linked to 
outrageous pay packages, executives still yield considerable influence over their 
compensation. Compensation committees are often reluctant to hold a hard 
bargain with the CEO, particularly since CEOs play too big a role in the re-
nomination of board members. Directors generally have little to lose in salary 
negotiations, while the CEO has a great deal to gain.  
 
The threat of a corporate takeover can be a powerful constraint on executive 
behavior since top managers are likely to lose their jobs following a merger 
(Jensen, 1989). However, the takeover as a mechanism to shape management 
 
Company 
 
CEO 
# 
Chairman 
Abengoa   
Abertis   
Acerinox   
Amadeus   
ArcelorMittal   
BankInter   
DIA   
Enagas   
Endesa   
FCC   
Gas Natural   
IAG   
Indra    
Mediaset   
OHL   
REE   
 
Company 
 
CEO 
= 
Chairman 
Acciona   
ACS   
BBVA   
Bco Popular   
Bco Sabadell   
Bco Santander   
Caixabank   
Banesto   
Ferrovial   
Iberdrola   
Inditex   
Grifols   
Mapfre   
Repsol   
Sacyr   
Técnicas 
Reunidas   
Telefónica   
Viscofan   
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behavior is contingent on both public policy regarding mergers and acquisitions 
and the degree to which ownership structures permit hostile takeovers. As far as 
the sampled firms, the most important differences in the functioning of the 
market for corporate control emerge not from public policy but from differences 
in corporate ownership, control and ultimately scope (size and diversification). In 
Ibex 35 firms, the degree of inter-corporate holdings along with banks having 
relevant equity positions in a number of companies, make hostile takeovers more 
difficult. Moreover, the size and diversified portfolios of the observed large caps 
restrict the market for corporate control. The larger and the more industries the 
company is in, the less likely such conglomerates become takeover targets. 
 
The studies of Hofstede (1980, 1991) on the level of individualism-collectivism 
dominant in any given culture add a relevant behavioural insight to the analysis. 
He claims cultural differences can be described according to an individualistic-
collectivistic dimension. As far as the scope of this study, individualism is the 
cultural pattern that prevails (Western Europe, Spain). The generally accepted 
view is that the national culture predisposes members of that culture to either a 
collectivist or an individualistic orientation. Individualists are more short-term 
oriented, use a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the business exchange and tend 
to reduce the risks of doing business by signing a contract. Contract design-our 
analytical goal- is likely to be company-specific or follow industry rather than 
national trends.  
 
Corporate ownership structure and the weight of stock options in the 
compensation package have been identified as potentially conflicting issues for 
our research.  
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As far as ownership structure, the study deals with publicly traded companies 
with substantially dispersed ownership. The extent of ownership concentration in 
Spanish large caps presents a somehow hibryd picture. Applying the methodology 
developed by Trías in a study he conducted on Boards in Spanish listed 
companies, for our proposed market proxy (the Ibex 35), half of the 34 firms 
included in the index by the cut-off date (March 15, 2013) showed high to 
moderate levels of ownership dispersion (Trías, 2003) –those are firms type D 
and C, as computed in the table below. Out of the 17 that make up the other half 
listed in the Index, 8 have a dominant shareholder –with more than a 50 percent 
blockholding, labelled as type A- and 9 have either significant shareholdings 
adding up to more than 50 percent or one with an ownership stake exceeding 25 
percent, identified as type B. Hence it could be argued that stock option contracts 
are likely to be an effective remedy against potential agency problems for at least 
half of those firms. When matching the data broken down by type, to the actual 
granting of stock options, it is interesting to note that firms with relatively higher 
levels of dispersion (types D and C) indeed account for slightly less than half (9 
out of 19) of the option plans in place by that time. The evidence is more 
consistent with the theory when zooming in into the firms with the highest level 
of dispersion (type D), as half of those firms choose to award stock options. 
Table 6 below provides the full breakdown: 
 
Company Name Type 
Stock Option 
Plan 
(Yes/No)  
Abengoa A No 
Abertis B No 
Acciona B No 
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Acerinox B No 
ACS B Yes 
Amadeus C Yes 
ArcelorMittal D Yes 
Banco Popular C No 
Banco Sabadell D No 
Bankinter C Yes 
BBVA D        Yes 
Bco Santander D Yes 
BME D No 
Caixabank A No 
DIA D No 
Enagas D No 
Endesa A No 
FCC A Yes 
Ferrovial D Yes 
Gas Natural A Yes 
Grifols C No 
Iberdrola D Yes 
IAG C Yes 
Inditex A Yes 
Indra Sistemas B Yes 
Mapfre A Yes 
Mediaset B Yes 
Obrascón A Yes 
REE D No 
Repsol  B Yes 
Sacyr  B Yes 
Telefónica D Yes 
Técnicas Reunidas B No 
Viscofan D No 
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                           Type A Type B Type C Type D 
Total  (34) 8 9 5 12 
Percentage 23,53% 26,47% 14,71% 35,29% 
Stock Option Plan (19) 5 5 3 6 
Percentage (to total) 26,32% 26,32% 15,79% 31,58% 
Percentage (to type) 62,5% 55,56% 60% 50% 
       
 
Type A    dominant shareholder (more than 50 percent of outstanding shares)    
 Type B    significant shareholdings that accumulate to more than 50 percent or 
one with an ownership stake exceeding 25 percent  
Type C    significant shareholdings accumulate to less than 50 percent and none 
exceeds 25 percent  
Type D     significant shareholdings accumulate to less than 25 percent   
 
 
Table 6 – Ownership concentration and stock option granting in the Ibex 35 
 
Adapted from Trías (2003) using data as of the cut-off date (March 15, 2013) 
 
 
When assessing the full set of data collected for this study -30 Ibex 35 companies 
over the 18-year window- claims of equity-based pay as a means to counter 
potentially diverging utilities arising from dispersed ownership, are challenged 
by the evidence: 19 out the 30 firms granting options are type A and B (relatively 
high ownership concentration), while 11 are type C and D (relatively high 
dispersion). The list of Ibex 35 firms granting stock options while listed in the 
index, along with their ownership concentration/dispersion typology is presented 
below: 
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Ibex 35 firms granting Stock 
Options (1995-2013) 
Typology (ownership 
concentration/dispersion) 
ACS B 
Alba A 
Altadis D 
Amadeus C 
ArcelorMittal D 
Banesto A 
Bankinter C 
BBVA D 
Bco Santander D 
FCC A 
Ferrovial D 
Gamesa D 
Gas Natural A 
IAG C 
Iberdrola D 
Inditex A 
Indra Sistemas B 
Mapfre A 
Mediaset B 
Metrovacesa A 
NH Hoteles B 
Obrascón A 
Prisa B 
Repsol  B 
Sacyr  B 
Sogecable A 
Telefónica D 
Telefónica Moviles A 
Union Fenosa A 
Zeltia B 
 
                  Table 7 – Interplay of Ibex 35 SO granting firms and ownership               
concentration/dispersion typology (full list, 1995-2013) 
         
        Source:  Own elaboration 
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A relatively weaker shareholder right protection tradition in Spain –a sensitive 
issue as ownership dispersion increases- does not seem to undermine the use of 
equity-linked compensation.  
 
Additionally, the fairly extensive adoption in Spanish large caps of stock option 
systems may suggest some degree of converge towards the shareholder-centered 
model. Stock options are outcome-based contracts that align managers’ and 
shareholders’ incentives by encouraging the former to maximize firm value –the 
cornerstone of the shareholder-centered proposal. The distinction between the 
shareholder model (dominant in Anglo-Saxon business cultures) and the 
stakeholder-oriented model (prevailing in markets such as Central Europe and 
Japan) is nonetheless becoming somehow blurry (Betch and Mayer, 2001).  
 
7.4 Data Collected – Summary 
The study relies on publicly disclosed data –largely stock market quotes, 
financial statements and corporate governance reports- for the sampled firms. 
The rigorous disclosure requirements imposed upon listed companies in Spain 
made all relevant data available.  
 
For the variables that shape the stock option contracts under analysis –strike 
price, vesting, maturity, repricing and trading restrictions-, the data was sourced 
from the company filings with the Spanish securities market regulator -Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV).  
 
Following the dominant practice in the compensation literature, and required for 
companies when disclosing executive pay, stock option and stock appreciation 
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right (SAR) plans are hereby equally considered in analyzing their contractual 
design. Sharing identical compensation, retention and motivation features, both 
stock options and SARs reward stock price appreciation. Yet SARs do their job 
without causing as much dilution. If for instance, an employee has 100 options 
and the share price rises from 5 to 10, she will make 500. With a SAR, the 
company would settle that spread by giving the employee 50 shares of stock, 
rather than the 100 that would be granted upon exercising the options. However, 
employee ownership goals and tax breaks often persuade companies to award 
conventional options. 
 
The study draws on eighteen years of data, from 1995 through March 2013. The 
rationale for the starting date has to do with the fact that it was in the mid-90s 
that stock options began to gain relevance among Spanish large caps, accounting 
for an increasing share of the executive pay package. The regulatory framework 
applying to stock option grants, discussed in section 10, helps explain the wide 
adoption of this compensation system in Ibex 35 firms. The choice of March 2013 
as cut-off date results from the intent to capture more recent stock options plans, 
on top of reflecting on the pay-performance sensitivity of this compensation 
practice over a significant time frame, including before and after the 2007-08 
financial crisis.  
 
In order to assess the impact of stock options on the risk-adjusted returns of Ibex 
35 firms granting the award while listed in the index, a large number of risk-
adjusted returns are computed for the sampled firms (18 years of data, ca. 
100.000 observations), to feed a two-step panel data analysis. First the 
contribution of the stock option plan to firm-specific return is estimated through 
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a regression analysis. The same technique is then applied to address the core of 
the research questions, namely how effectively the design of the contract aligns 
potentially diverging incentives. For that, the pool of Ibex 35 stock option 
contracts is graded, according to the alignment power of the core stock option 
value drivers identified in the literature. That grading goes into the explanatory 
variable of the regression, in order to capture the sensitivity of firm-specific 
returns to differences in contract design.  
 
The next section discusses the challenges and trade-offs firms typically face 
when designing the stock option plan, along the five value drivers hereby 
analized, i.e. choice of strike, vesting, maturity, repricing and trading 
restrictions.  
 
8. Critical Review of Contract Design in the Sampled Firms 
When stock options boomed in the early 1990s, many investors greeted them as 
the answer to a long-standing problem: how to make managers act like owners. 
Despite taking some of the blame for recent corporate scandals, loosing the battle 
to stay off the balance sheet and erratic stock markets, stock options remain 
fairly popular among large capitalization firms.   
 
Indeed over the 18-year window of this study, 30 Spanish large capitalization 
firms issued stock option plans while listing in the Ibex 35 index.  
8.1 General Granting Practices 
Dilution and expensing concerns are causing a hold back on stock option 
granting. Companies are paying increasing attention to shareholder fears over 
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dilution and the impact of stock option expensing on earnings. As a result, the 
amount of shares used to deliver stock option compensation has been steadily 
declining, while the debate on how to value stock options is still unfolding.   
 
A too often mistake incurred by most companies is the mismatch between stock 
option granting and firm growth. If the annual rate of option granting goes up 
beyond the increase in earnings per share (EPS), shareholder ownership rights are 
technically and literally diluted. Simple figures may illustrate the point: if stock 
option issue rate rises by 10 per cent a year, the company has to increase in value 
by at least 10 per cent for the pre-existing shareholders to break even. 
 
Thompson and Cook (1998) inquired into the dilutive effect of stock options for 
current shareholders, by looking beyond reported EPS, computing the difference 
between basic EPS and diluted EPS for a sample of 105 large market 
capitalization US firms. They showed that the diluting effect of issuing stock 
options is measurable, to be computed as the difference between the strike price 
of all outstanding options and the market price of the shares –the ‘cost’ is the 
difference between the price granted to the optionee and the price that could be 
obtained by issuing the shares to the market. The market looks at diluted EPS not 
basic EPS. If there were a greater or lesser number of diluted shares outstanding 
at a time, it is market value per share, not total market value, which would 
change. Thus the cost of stock options to shareholders is measured by the 
difference between actual market value per share, and the per share market value 
that would exist if there were no stock options outstanding. 
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The dilutive effect of stock options on EPS and hence on stock price is a function 
of two numbers: the number of options outstanding in relation to total shares 
outstanding (the option ‘overhang’) and the per share appreciation in valuable 
options. Two companies could have the same percentage dilution. One might get 
there by a moderate number of options outstanding and a high option 
appreciation (favourable result); the other gets there by a large number of options 
outstanding and a low option appreciation (less favourable result). Low dilution 
per se is not necessarily favourable; nor is a high one necessarily unfavourable. 
It depends on the reason why dilution may be low or high.  
 
The cost of options is reflected in the difference between basic EPS and diluted 
EPS. This difference results in a reduction in share price from what would have 
been had valuable options not been outstanding. Since a company’s aggregate 
market value is a constant at any point in time, any gain in option value results in 
an equal reduction in total shareholder value available to other shareholders. 
 
Expensing is in turn the outcome of a long-standing debate around the accounting 
treatment of stock options. Beginning in 2005 for the sampled firms, accounting 
standards require that all forms of equity-based compensation be expensed, 
making a charge to earnings as with any other compensation type. Stock options, 
generally granted at-the-money, did not incur compensation cost under the 
intrinsic value method, which only measures the excess of the market price over 
the exercise price. The new rules introduced the fair value method, a single 
standard that requires the company to write a compensation expense measured at 
the grant date based on the fair value of the award. A generally accepted option 
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pricing model should be used to determine the fair value (Black-Scholes or a 
binomial model). This relevant issue is further discussed in section 11. 
 
As the reward to absolute share price increases without incurring a charge to 
earnings –the free ride of at-the-money options- is over, more diversified pay 
packages, discouraged in the past as they did accrue compensation cost, are 
emerging. A new compensation landscape is unfolding, with a decrease in fixed-
price options in favor of other long-term incentives, still equity-based but with a 
balanced mix of options and shares and a tighter link to performance. Restricted 
stock –shares that are forfeitable until time-based and/or performance-based 
restrictions lapse-, plain shares and cash are gaining ground in the executive 
compensation mix. Even if such a move is already under way, stock options still 
account for a large share of long-term compensation in the sampled Ibex 35 
firms.  
 
8.2 The Choice of Strike Price 
 
A typical stock option plan has the strike price set equal to the stock price on the 
day of the grant. Slight variations include averaging the highest and lowest 
values on that date, or taking a weighted average of a number of days before 
and/or after the grant date. As a result of this at-the-money design, any 
subsequent share price appreciation benefits the option holder, who is rewarded 
for share price increases often attributable to market factors beyond her control, 
such as interest rate moves. A growing number of investors argue that such 
option grants are too generous and fail to provide sufficient incentive to 
managers. 
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Alternatively, premium stock options differ from traditional at-the-money 
options by having a higher strike price when granted. As a result, these options 
begin to deliver returns only after shareholders have seen stock price gains. In 
terms of value, the higher strike reduces the value of the option. Advocates of 
premium options claim that the higher exercise price creates stronger incentives 
to further increase share price.  
 
As claims to link pay to performance mount, some firms are making the option 
exercise contingent on the underlying shares hitting a minimum price, often 
combined with doing so by a certain date. Such price and price & time-vesting 
options are not exercisable unless the firm’s stock price reaches that prescribed 
level or barrier -which is set higher than the stock price at grant date-, within a 
given time frame. Firms may require the stock price to remain at or above the 
barrier for some specified time for the option to vest. Once the option is vested, 
it becomes a regular option exercisable at the strike price agreed upon when 
granted. Ocassionally price-vesting is combined with a reload feature. Reloading 
implies granting new options following the exercise of underlying options where 
the exercise price is paid using previously owned shares. Such a design is likely 
to encourage stock ownership among optionees, as the exercise that triggers the 
reload feature is paid with shares previously held by the beneficiary.  
  
Following the efficient markets hypothesis, a dilemma may arise in the choice of 
the date to set the initial parameter values. Under the assumption that stock 
options increase the likelihood of superior performance, capital markets 
efficiency implies that the resulting expected value changes will be incorporated 
into share prices when option plans are announced. If firms set options at-the-
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money after share prices have this information built in, the increase in value 
following the stock option announcement operates like a premium on the strike 
price. The opposite effect would result from choosing the market price of a day 
prior to the announcement, as the upward price adjustment would leave the 
option already in-the-money when granted –a price increase certainly not 
attributable to managerial performance.    
 
The conventional at-the-money design is the preferred choice of Ibex 35 firms 
granting options. Only Inditex and Metrovacesa granted options with an exercise 
price below market value at grant date. Metrovacesa put together a quite innovate 
design involving a double contingency bar. Discount factors are applied to the 
strike price over the option term (20 per cent the first year, 25 per cent the 
second and 30 per cent the third and last year of the program) provided options 
previously granted are exercised. In turn, for options to be exercised the optionee 
has to retain at least 90 per cent of the shares acquired on previous option 
exercises. Telefónica also challenged the standard by introducing a price & time-
vesting plan in February 2000. To enter this broad-based program called TIES, 
employees had to purchase a variable number of shares –depending on their total 
compensation- at a discount that in turn entitled them to receive up to 26 options 
for each share acquired. The option exercise –also at a discount- was made 
contingent on the share price surpassing the barrier of 20,5 euros, something that 
never happened. As a result, the plan expired worthless in February 2005. 
 
Price averages are widely used to determine the at-the-money fair market value, 
ranging from the last 10 to 180 days before grant date. Averages are calculated as 
arithmetic means and the time frames used by Ibex 35 companies are noticeably 
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longer than those applied in other markets, such as the US, UK or Germany. Even 
if averages are likely to differ from actual prices at the date of grant, the very 
reason for using averages is to avoid short-term volatility around any given day 
and therefore better reflect market values. Strict comparisons between strike 
prices and current prices at grant date could lead us to wrongly label as out-of-
the-money or in-the-money plans that do not intend to apply premiums or 
discounts over the exercise price but more accurately reflect market values.  
 
Averages are also an extensive practice in Ibex 35 firms when determining the 
underlying stock price at exercise –from as far back as 60 days prior to exercise 
to as far forward as 90 days following the chosen exercise date. Taking averages 
to determine the option payoff prevents the optionee from timing the exercise to 
earnings manipulation or information releases -assuming options can be cashed 
out (settled by receiving the spread in cash) or immediate trading of the acquired 
shares is permitted. Imposing trading constraints on shares received on option 
exercise yields similar results with the added value that it fosters a stock 
ownership culture. Further discussion follows in section 8.6. 
 
It should be noted that a majority of Ibex 35 firms granted American options, 
which could be exercised –upon vesting- at any time before maturity. Only eight 
firms (Gamesa, Gas Natural, Iberdrola, Iberia/IAG, Inditex, Metrovacesa, 
Sogecable and Telefónica Móviles) followed the European option design, setting 
a pre-specified date to exercise the awards.  
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8.2.1 A Past Incentive to the ‘At-The-Money’ Design 
  
Firms used to account for stock options using the intrinsic value method, a 
practice no longer valid as expensing became mandatory. The intrinsic value of 
the option is the amount by which the quoted market price of the stock exceeds 
the exercise price of the option on the date of grant. Stock options are usually 
granted with a zero intrinsic value, by setting the exercise price equal to the 
market value of the date of grant. Then disclosure was limited to a footnote to the 
financial statements. Otherwise options would incur a charge to earnings, just as 
any other compensation. Avoiding this hit to earnings therefore became a 
prominent factor that accounted for the popularity of at-the-money stock options. 
Such a free ride was consistent with short-termed management preferences. 
Although it could be argued that investors should be able to see through the 
footnote disclosure, information that remains off the accounting statements is 
unlikely to be fully incorporated into market prices.  
 
8.2.2 Alternative Choices – Relative Performance 
 
Traditional fixed-price at-the-money stock options often fail to deliver their 
intended goal of aligning managers’ incentives with those of shareholders. If 
options do not differentiate between value created by external factors and 
individual performance, managers may be rewarded regardless of merit –as 
happened during the stock market run-up of the late 1990s. Likewise, top-
performing executives may be penalized if their tenure coincides with a bear 
market.  
 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) argue that compensation contracts based upon firm 
performance, not adjusting for industry or market performance, subject 
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executives to stock and product market behaviors that are clearly beyond 
management control. Alternatively, relative-performance-based compensation 
aims at tightening the link between managerial efforts and compensation by 
rewarding managers only for that portion of performance under their control, 
filtering out the effects of performance that derive from factors outside 
management control, such as industry or market-wide gains or losses.  
 
8.2.3 The Case of Indexed Stock Options 
 
Financial theory claims that investors are rewarded for managing systematic 
(market) risk as they can diversify away idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk. 
Conversely, managers –whose job is not diversifying but maximizing firm value-, 
should be rewarded for properly managing firm-specific risk. Management 
performance directly affects the idiosyncratic component, but cannot control for 
the common, market component. Incentive contracts base then an agent’s 
compensation on her performance relative to the common performance; they 
reward the firm-specific component of performance after netting out market 
effects.  
 
When a manager is risk-averse and shareholders are risk-neutral -our proposition 
based on agency theory-, compensating the executive for the outcome under her 
control and filtering out the common uncertainty beyond her control results in 
more efficient contracts. In the specific case of stock options, the common 
component of a firm’s stock return should be filtered out, with the idiosyncratic 
component remaining to determine the option payoff. Such is the rationale behind 
indexed stock options. 
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When designing an indexed option, stock price performance should be broken 
down into common (systematic) and idiosyncratic (firm-specific) components. An 
index, either an industry-wide index or a competitor’s stock price, should be 
chosen to account for the common component. As argued by Meulbroek (2001b), 
setting up the right benchmark is a critical issue, as this index should measure 
precisely the part of performance that is common to other firms in the industry or 
the market and beyond the executive’s control.  
 
The dynamics of indexed options are discussed by Johnson and Tian (2000) in 
their seminal paper on absolute indexing. In summary, at grant date, the strike 
price of the indexed option is set equal (in relative terms) to the benchmark stock 
(index). Thereon, the benchmark stock tracks the expected common performance 
of the firm’s stock over time, with the result that if the stock performs any better 
than the index, the option is in-the-money and the optionee can collect the gain. 
Simply put, indexed stock options reward relative rather than absolute 
performance. They have no value unless the underlying stock does better than the 
preset index. In a rising market, the bar is a high one. But in a declining market, 
an executive at a company with a falling stock price can still cash in, as long as 
the decline is less steep than that of its peers.  
 
The difference in payout from traditional to indexed options can be significant. 
Take the case of a 1.000 share option grant at 10 euros per share that is tied to 
the performance of an industry index. If the company’s stock rises by 20 percent 
to 12 euros, while the market rises 40 percent, the options would have no 
immediate value, since the company has underperformed. With an at-the-money, 
‘plain-vanilla’ option, that grant would pay 2.000 euros. But if the overall market 
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falls 30 percent while the stock dropped just 20 percent, to 8 euros, that indexed 
grant would still be worth 1.000 euros -the difference between the index and the 
company performance. If the stock rises in a declining market, the payout would 
still be higher. 
 
One drawback of indexed options is that they do not pay as much as traditional 
options when executives do outperform. If, for instance, the company stock rises 
to 23 euros while the index rose to just 15 euros, the options would be worth 
8.000 euros -compared to 13.000 euros with the conventional at-the-money 
option. To make up for that shortfall, the number of indexed options granted 
should be higher -what practitioners call the ‘gross-up’ practice-, if they are to 
match the economic value of traditional options.  
 
8.2.4 The Indexed Option Payoff   
Given the benchmark stock price, the payoff of the indexed stock option at 
maturity is: 
 
Max ST – HT, 0 
 
ST = stock price at expiration 
HT = index price at maturity (the strike price) 
 
It is well known that options never carry negative value for the holder, as long as 
they grant a right which exercise strictly depends on making a profit.  
 
If thinking of HT as a synthetic benchmark stock that tracks the expected 
performance of the firm’s stock, the indexed stock option can be viewed as an 
exchange option as studied by Margrabe (1978). To exercise the indexed option, 
Pablo Collazzo Yelpo                                                                                                        
 
95
                                  Modeling Stock Option Contracts – Evidence from Spain 
 
 
the executive ‘exchanges’ the benchmark stock for her firm’s stock and receives 
the difference between the two prices.  
 
So absolute growth is not enough, as the option does not pay off for merely 
having positive growth in the stock price. In other words, the option does not pay 
off when changes in the stock price reflect only common factors, as opposed to 
traditional stock options that reward absolute price increases regardless of 
relative market performance. This feature implies that indexed options have 
lower probability of expiring in-the-money, and therefore have lower value.  
 
A key determinant of option valuation is volatility. As pointed out by Johnson 
and Tian (200), instead of the volatility of the firm (which has both common and 
idiosyncratic components), the volatility of the firm relative to the index (or 
idiosyncratic volatility) is what matters. As the correlation with the index 
increases, the idiosyncratic volatility falls and thus contributes less to the 
indexed option value. In other words, as the correlation increases, the proportion 
of performance that is firm-specific falls, so the option has lower value.  
 
Therefore, the manager does not want her stock and the index to be perfectly 
correlated, since then, by definition, the indexed option would never be in-the-
money. Perfect correlation implies that the stock’s return is dependent only on 
common –systematic- factors. Because there is no idiosyncratic component in the 
firm’s performance, the executive cannot influence performance and thus 
receives no reward.  
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Johnson and Tian (2000) go on to explain that the indexed option value is as its 
maximum when the correlation between the stock and the index is zero –
performance is hundred percent driven by firm-specific factors. Thus, indexed 
options could give a manager choosing between two otherwise identical projects, 
an incentive to choose the one whose returns have the lowest correlation with the 
index returns. If the index is the market portfolio, reducing correlation while 
holding firm and index volatility constant reduces systematic risk, increasing 
firm value.  
 
8.2.5 Systematic Risk – A Beta-related Model 
  
Note that if the index is the market portfolio, the correlation between the stock 
and the index can be seen as the β  (Beta) in the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). The model defines the β  coefficient as the sensitivity of any given 
stock returns to changes in market (index) returns. As stated earlier, in indexed 
stock option models, such index could be the overall market or a peer group 
benchmark.  
 
Table 8 below shows payoff scenarios for indexed and traditional stock options 
in bullish and bearish markets, according to different values of β . If β=1, i.e., 
stock and index prices are perfectly correlated, the exercise value of the indexed 
option is zero, in either bullish or bearish markets. Traditional option holders 
instead, can still profit when the stock moves as much as the market, as long as 
this movement is upwards. They collect a positive payoff in bullish markets, 
while the option would expire worthless in a downfall market.  
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The case of so-called ‘aggressive’ stocks -with β>1-, represents the only scenario 
of positive payoff for the indexed optionee in bullish markets, as the firm’s price 
beats the index. However, in a bear market, the stock would fall deeper than the 
market, bringing the indexed holder payoff down to zero. In a bull market, results 
are of similar direction for traditional options, though certainly differ in 
magnitude. If the stock increases 30 per cent, while the market goes up by only 
20 per cent, the indexed optionee would only pocket the net-of-market increase, 
in this case 10 per cent. Her peer holding traditional options would instead 
collect the absolute value increase of the stock, namely 30 per cent. For bear 
markets, traditional option payoff is always zero, as shown in the table. 
 
When it comes to ‘defensive’ stocks -with β<1-, in a bullish market the indexed 
manager gets zero, while the traditional option holder still profits from the 
absolute increase in stock price, even if less than the index. It is in bearish 
markets when the comparative attractiveness of indexed options stands out, as 
already noted.  A ‘defensive’ stock in terms of beta means that its price does not 
fall as much as the index in a market downfall. In relative terms, the stock 
outperforms the index. Such accomplishment triggers indexed option rewards, 
enabling the manager to collect the difference between the index and the stock 
price. Traditional option payoff in bearish markets is zero, even if the executive 
might have succeeded in holding the stock not to plunge as much as the market.  
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Beta 
Payoff Bull Market Payoff Bear Market 
Indexed 
Option 
Traditional 
Option 
Indexed 
Option 
Traditional 
Option 
1 0 > 0 0 0 
> 1 > 0 > 0 0 0 
< 1 0 > 0 > 0 0 
 
    Table 8 - Payoffs in bull and bear markets for indexed and traditional options                
according to different beta values  
     
    Source:  Own elaboration.  
 
The model suggests that in order to reach positive payoffs, the manager wants an 
‘aggressive’ stock -β>1- in bullish markets, and a ‘defensive’ one -β<1- when the 
market goes down. Since by definition, systematic –market- risk is beyond the 
executive’s control, he should manage firm-specific risk so as to outperform the 
index. This idiosyncratic risk management should be such as to increase 
systematic risk exposure –as measured by beta- in bullish markets, while 
decreasing the impact of common –systematic- factors when the market goes 
down. To alter stock return sensitivity to market return (beta), the manager can 
only operate on factors under his control. In other words, he wants to manage 
firm-specific risk so as to increase beta in bullish markets –pushing up stock 
returns above the index- and decrease exposure to factors of systematic risk in a 
bear market –preventing the stock from falling as much as the index. 
 
Such behavior would prompt managers to accept more profitable, riskier projects 
when markets are up, while going for less profitable but less risky projects in 
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bearish markets. How to timely accomplish this crucial switch goes beyond the 
scope of this study, and could be subject of future research.  
 
8.3 Vesting 
 
Getting the stock option is not the same as getting shares of stock. The option is 
the right, but not the obligation, to purchase a share at a specific price, at a 
specific time. But the option holder has to earn the right to purchase those 
shares; she needs to become vested in those shares. Vesting is the period of time 
–known as lock-up period- during which employees are restricted from exercising 
their options. The graph below (figure 5) illustrates the pay-off of an at-the-
money option, i.e. the strike price equals the current stock price, as the grant 
gains value over time, moving into the money. However, the beneficiary would 
not be able to immediately cash in that value, as the option right becomes 
exercisable only after some time, and/or once a given performance threshold is 
attained, set at St+1 .  From that point onwards, the option may be exercised, in 
total or in part, at a single point in time or gradually, and once exercised, either 
the underlying shares are received, or the spread (ST – St) monetized. Taxes are 
due upon selling those shares for a gain.  
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Figure 5 – The dynamics of stock options over time 
 
Source: Own  
 
Vesting schemes are a distinctive feature of stock options. They are largely based 
solely on continued employment. Yet making vesting contingent on the stock 
price hitting a certain price level –price-vesting- or on reaching financial or 
operational goals –performance-vesting- would boost the strategic role of vesting 
in the design of stock option contracts. Vesting should not only contribute to 
retention (mostly achieved through a time-vesting design) but also –and 
critically- to performance (resulting from performance-vesting requirements). 
 
As noted, time-vesting is likely to ensure loyalty and retention -at least for some 
time-, as the employee is induced to stay in the company to realize the expected 
stock option gains. The ban on exercise is often the result of the so-called cliff 
vesting, which restricts the execution of the right to purchase the stock for a 
fixed period of time. Upon vesting, i.e. once the lock-up period has passed, the 
Value 
Time Granting 
(St)  
Stock price 
(S) 
Vesting 
(St+1) 
Exercising 
(ST) 
Sale 
of 
share
 
Strike 
price 
 Spread gain (ST – St)  
 Dividend & 
voting 
rights  
Capital  
gain 
Taxable 
income 
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whole option grant becomes exercisable. Such a design maximizes retention, yet 
may curb motivation in case of long vesting periods. An improved mix of 
retention and motivation could be achieved by allowing options to vest in steps, 
over time, so that the optionee gets to exercise in-the-money options earlier on –
the so-called graded vesting. Such vesting scheme enables executives to 
periodically collect a fraction of the option gains, from the vesting point in time, 
up to the maturity of the contract.  
 
Longer vesting periods are intuitively appealing from an incentive-contracting 
standpoint and are likely to be favored by the large, dispersely owned firms 
hereby studied. The high liquidity distinctive of Ibex 35 firms is set to attract 
short-term investors, which may in turn bias management towards pursuing 
shorter term gains at the expense of long-term shareholder value. One way to 
redirect managers to the long run would be by means of longer vesting periods in 
equity-based compensation. 
 
Setting the vesting period accounts for part of the choice, as companies may 
prescribe a specific schedule to settle vested options, in further efforts to stretch 
the the incentive-alignment power of the options over time. Such is the case in 
the sampled Ibex 35 firms.   
 
On a practical note, it would be advisable not to set a single vesting in the 
‘umbrella’ stock option plan but rather in the individual agreements, so as to 
accommodate the choice of vesting to different retention and motivation needs 
tailored to different option holders. 
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Graded vesting remains fairly common among Ibex 35 firms. When jointly 
considering percentage vested and start-off date, a 25 percent yearly vesting from 
grant date is the dominant trend.  
 
From a time value stance, the earlier the optionee may potentially realize spread 
gains, the higher the option value –and the higher the compensation cost to be 
charged to earnings. Earlier gradual vesting plans enhance employee attraction at 
the expense of their retention feature, as stock options lose much of their 
retention power once vested. 
 
Indra, which granted stock options to both board members and management, 
agreed on a different vesting system for each group over the five options plans 
approved between 1999 and 2008, which included the then unconventional choice 
of price and time vesting requirements –a 50 percent premium over the strike 
price by the exercise date or else only 60 percent of the option grant could be 
exercised.  
 
When earlier vesting is not curbed by imposing restrictions on the sale of the 
acquired shares –or similar retention-enhancer terms aimed at promoting a 
managerial ownership culture-, claims arise that executives are potentially 
extracting rents from shareholders by exercising undue managerial power over 
their own pay setting process. 
 
Earlier vesting accounts for higher option value, while the compensation cost to 
be borne by the firm is higher. Stock option valuation is nonetheless dependent 
on a number of factors, so vesting interplays with other key terms such as 
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maturity or trading restrictions imposed on acquired shares, as discussed in the 
following section.  
 
Stock options are indeed a case of value-transfer rather than value-creation -the 
gains captured by the option holder, potentially enhanced by earlier vesting, are 
transferred by shareholders, in a zero-sum game fashion. Although there is a fair 
amount of compensation literature claiming that the value transferred by share 
owners is higher than the value perceived by optionees (Hall and Murphy, 2002; 
Jost and Wolff, 2003) the expected present value of the attraction, retention and 
motivation features embedded in the grant, net of expensing and dilution costs 
should be positive for stock options to make economic sense.  
 
Compensation that relies solely on time-vesting requirements is likely to merely 
reward tenure, not performance. Stock options that vest on achieving individual 
or corporate goals –such as EPS growth, sales revenue or market share- do a 
better job in aligning incentives by linking compensation to performance beyond 
share price appreciation. Using the stock price as performance measure means 
benchmarking the manager’s performance against the market’s expectation of 
such performance. Shareholder value should instead be based on company-
specific (non-systematic) risk management as the market (systematic) component 
of the firm’s returns could be easily replicated by the risk-averse share owner. 
For an efficient design following mainstream optimal contracting, compensation 
should be stripped of market factors, and linked to (measurable) managerial 
performance.  
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Pure performance-vesting options –that vest upon reaching the preset goal, 
regardless of the elapsed time- are nonetheless fairly rare -the performance target 
usually has a time-reference built in. 
 
Alternative compensation schemes contingent on performance are the so-called 
restricted stock or performance shares. They are actual stock awards (or the right 
to receive them) forfeitable until the restrictions –time but mostly performance-
based- lapse.  
 
Among the sampled firms, very few performance-vesting stock options/SARs 
were identified. Some, like Gamesa, required strategic goals to be met. Others, 
like Ferrovial and Iberdrola, used financial measures. For Ferrovial’s options to 
vest, its average return on equity (ROE) over the three years following the grant 
had to reach the 15 per cent bar. If higher than 10 per cent but lower than 15 per 
cent, the option yielded a proportional pay-off and if lower than 10 per cent, no 
payment was made. Iberdrola in turn required a 9 percent real EPS increase over 
the 3-year cliff vesting period. To determine the final pay out, the spread gain 
(price difference times number of options) had to be no higher than three times 
the optionee’s average salary. The product of the option gain times the 
employee’s average variable compensation percentage over the previous three 
years was divided over the stock price at exercise to determine the number of 
shares the option holder finally received. If the average of her percentage of 
variable compensation over this three year period was less than 50 percent, no 
payment was made.  
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A remarkable case was that of Banco Santander, which approved in June 2005 an 
innovative relative-performance-based stock option plan. A peer group 
encompassed by the 30 largest banks by market capitalization –as of October 
2004- was set up as benchmark. A twofold requirement had to be met for options 
to vest. On the one hand, its share price percentage increase had to be higher than 
that of 20 of the 30 competitors included in the peer group. To measure whether 
such requirement was met, the weighted average share price of the first fifteen 
trading sessions of 2005 (9.07 euros, the strike price) was compared to the same 
first fifteen trading days of 2007. Additionally, EPS over the period 2004-2006 
had to grow more than those of 20 of the 30 selected peers. Only when the 
growth rates of both its share price and EPS surpassed those of 20 of the its 30 
worldwide competitors, the optionees -2.750 members of the management team- 
became vested. Moreover, a three-year cliff vesting period was set. Upon 
exercise, option holders were given a number of shares equal in value to the 
difference between the strike and the prevailing market price at time of exercise, 
net of withholding taxes.  
 
The plan introduced some design features resembling the often praised indexed 
stock options. To that extent, a peer group of competitors was set up as 
benchmark. However, in the pure indexed design, the strike price remains 
variable, equal to the value of the chosen index. Should the share price finish 
above such index, the optionee would be able to exercise vested options at the 
index price for a gain. Instead, Banco Santander set a fixed strike price with the 
exercise contingent on the growth of both share price and EPS relative to those of 
two thirds of the peer group chosen as benchmark. Performance was therefore 
measured in relative terms –against competitors- rather than imposing absolute 
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value goals. Granting firms should bear in mind that performance options may 
lose their motivation potential should the requirements be too rigorous.  
 
Another feature commonly observed in Ibex 35 stock option contracts is the 
provision of accelerated vesting for change in control (merger and acquisition 
scenarios).  
 
Finally, a non-trivial rule seldom made explicit in the stock plans reviewed is the 
forfeiture of unvested options upon joining a competitor –a requirement usually 
enforced in stock option grants everywhere.   
 
8.4 Maturity 
 
The stock option contracting problem comes down to a choice across the five key 
variables hereby studied: strike price, vesting scheme, option maturity, repricing 
and trading restrictions on acquired shares. Specifically, the time-driven value 
factors –maturity and vesting- closely interplay in the alignment of management 
and shareholder incentives. The spread or gap between vesting and option term, 
namely the exercise window of the option, is likely to signal whether optimal 
contracting or managerial power prevails in the pay setting process. Either case 
has an impact on the firm’s share price, as managerial contracts are disclosed, 
hence factored in the stock price.  
 
The distribution of Ibex 35 maturities is fairly widespread, with the mean at 
nearly five (4,9) years. Expiration dates range from as early as 3 years to as late 
as 10 years yet nearly 75 percent of the population accumulate to the 5-year term. 
Indeed only one company listed in the Ibex 35 has chosen the 10-year option term 
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(Amadeus). The remaining 29 firms granting stock options set them to expire in a 
maximum of 7 years. 
  
When revisiting the choice of maturity from an incentive contracting standpoint, 
the concepts of intrinsic and time value, key to option pricing models, regain 
central stage. Briefly stated, as represented in figure 6 below, the intrinsic value 
of an option is the difference between the current price of the underlying security 
and the option’s exercise price (for a call such as a stock option). Only when in-
the-money do options have intrinsic value, as they never carry negative value.  
 
 
 
                  Figure 8 – Intrinsic value of a call option 
                  Source:  Own elaboration 
 
Prior to expiration, the difference between the value of the option (its premium) 
and its intrinsic value is called time value, as shown in figure 7 below. Time 
value is the amount someone would pay for the potential gain resulting from the 
option ending up in-the-money (or deeper in-the-money) by the expiration date. 
In other words, it is the price of the probability of the option moving (deeper) 
into the money before maturity. As such, even an out-of-the-money option (no 
intrinsic value) will have time value before expiration.  
 
 
        Figure 7 – Time value of an option 
Time 
value = 
Option 
premium - 
Intrinsic  
value 
Intrinsic  
value = 
Current  
stock price - 
Strike  
price 
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                  Source:  Own elaboration.  
Volatility and time to expiration are positively correlated with the time value 
portion of an option. Higher volatility estimates reflecting greater expected 
fluctuations (in either direction) in the price of the underlying security, have a 
positive impact on option value. Similarly, the longer the amount of time for 
market conditions to work to the option holder's benefit, the greater the time 
value. 
 
The stock option loses its time value as its expiration date nears. At expiration it 
is worth only its intrinsic value. Conversely, the time value of the option grows 
as its maturity is pushed forward. The longer the term, the higher the probability 
for the manager to exercise the vested option for a profit.  
 
However, vesting periods burden the timing for stock option exercise. It follows 
that the shorter the vesting period, namely the sooner the manager can exercise 
in-the-money options, the higher the value of the grant. Shorter vesting terms 
coupled with longer maturities deliver increased value for the optionee as the 
time value of the option augments.  
 
We then compared weighted average maturities and weighted average vesting 
terms in the sampled firms (*).  
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Figure 8 – Maturity vs. Vesting in the Ibex 35 
Source: Own elaboration.   
 
(*)Averages for both maturity and vesting schedules have been calculated 
adjusting for the number of plans per term and for cliff and graded vesting 
design. Companies with combined cliff and graded vesting have been counted 
either or based on the relative size of the grants. 
 
 
This outcome closely matches the managerial power proposition hereby applied 
to assess the stock option contract design. From an optimal contracting stance 
and controlling for the option term, diligent boards should balance out the 
attraction contribution of shorter vesting with the retention and long-run value 
creation features embedded in longer vesting schedules. Alternatively, if faster 
time-vesting is preferred, the board could shorten the option maturity. As a 
result, the horizon of the incentive contract is decreased altogether, potentially 
allowing for new plans to be eventually issued –shortening the maturities and 
increasing the recurrency arguably better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ 
incentives as plans would  be tailored to prevailing attraction, retention and 
motivation needs. Wide exercise periods for vested options provide managers 
2,6 
4.9 
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Weighted average 
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Maturity vs. Vesting in the Ibex 35 
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with the chance to extract rents from shareholders, as optionees would have 
ample opportunities to time the exercise of the grant as a result of the mix of 
earlier vesting and longer maturity –relative to vesting. Such design pootentially 
foregoes the retention power of the option and the incentive alignment that comes 
with equity-based pay, should the beneficiary offload the shares right away. 
Conversely, a narrower gap between vesting and maturing better aligns 
managerial performance to shareholder value over the same time horizon, as 
retention and incentive-alignment drivers hold over longer periods –relative to 
option maturity, hence yielding shorther exercise windows.   
 
After vesting on average 2.6 years after grant date, Ibex 35 option awards remain 
exercisable for just 2.3 years thereafter, maturing on average after 4.9 years (1.9 
times average vesting). In the modeling section that follows, a grading system is 
proposed in order to assess this relationship between maturity and vesting period 
for the sampled firms. Such grading will feed the panal data analysis hereby 
proposed, so as to address the core question that drives this research, i.e. whether 
the design of the stock option contract is shaped by the managerial power of the 
executive team or else those contract follow the premises of incentive 
contracting, where board and managers reach a better balance of their respective 
utility functions.  
     
There is nonetheless no such thing as an optimal incentive-alignment point. In a 
fashion similar to that prescribed by the classical theory of capital structure, 
optimal alignment should come as a result of checks and balances and arm’s 
length bargaining between board and managers. The incentive-alignment 
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paradigm highlights the sought-after outcome, i.e. maximizing incentives while 
minimizing compensation costs. How to get there is a firm-specific recipe.  
 
Some industries may call for a blend of longer vesting and longer maturity 
should management performance only be assessable over the long run. Firms with 
shorter business cycles may instead prefer shorter vesting for shorter maturity 
options if their competitive advantage lies in short-term decision making. We 
claim that the relative value figure –maturity relative to vesting- is what matters 
in incentive contracting. 
 
Managers could be persuaded to forgo the mix of long maturity-short vesting if 
some remarkable side benefits from shortening those relative values are properly 
underlined. If the outcome of arm-length bargaining are shorter maturity-shorter 
vesting contracts, managers could benefit from avoiding underwater options. The 
same grant size approved by shareholders could be broken down, say in annual 
grants, decreasing the likelihood of long-term options dropping out-of-the-
money, as current market prices would be used as main input to set the strike 
price for such periodic grants. Taking into account that repricing is more and 
more being explicitly banned from stock option contracts, longer maturity grants 
may well expire worthless. There may be however, tax implications to consider. 
In the Spanish case, annual option grants would prevent the employee from 
profiting from a significant reduction in income taxes incurred on exercise. 
Further details on the tax treatment of options are discussed in section 10.3. 
 
Additionally, being time to expiration positively correlated to option value, the 
shorter the term the lower the compensation cost borne by the firm, regardless of 
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the option pricing model used. The lower the hit to earnings –and ultimately to 
share prices- the better for both current and future share owners.   
 
Another major shareholder concern would be confronted by cutting down long 
term options: the ‘overhang’ problem. The measure of stock option usage is 
called ‘overhang’, which is defined as stock options granted, plus those 
remaining to be granted, as a percentage of the total shares outstanding at a given 
company. Stock option overhang has grown dramatically over the past decade 
because of much larger option awards and increased option eligibility. Overhang 
has a dilutive effect because option grants represent a potential future issue of 
shares. In turn, more outstanding shares have a downward pressure on stock 
prices. Shorter maturity would therefore account for less overhang and reduced 
dilution.  
 
8.5 Repricing  
  
To lower the price of out-of-the-money options –otherwise known as repricing- 
in response to declining market values has been openly criticized as a 
management perquisite that has little potential for adding value to the firm.  
 
In a repricing, the option price is amended to reduce it to the current fair market 
value or, alternatively, the underwater stock option is canceled and a new option 
is granted with a strike price equal to the current, now lower, market value 
(indirect repricing). Either course of action is considered repricing. 
 
The rationale for assessing the allowance of repricing in our study is that such a 
practice is intrinsically detrimental in terms of incentive alignment, as it 
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basically shields the beneficiary against drops in the share price, in a zero-sum 
outcome –at the expense of shareholders. Despite some advocates (Saly, 1994; 
Acharya et al, 2000) further discussed above, repricing is far from balancing out 
the utilities of optionees and shareholders, as the former benefits from the 
unlimited gains of potential in-the-money options, with no downside –as the 
grant would be repricing if out-of-the-money. That leaves shareholders 
eventually compensating executives regardless of their performance –and even 
for underperforming, if the price drop results from poor managerial decisions. 
Hence repricing the grant is likely to suggest strong managerial power exerted in 
the pay-setting process.  
 
Such a practice is widely restricted in Ibex 35 firms. In terms of contract design, 
repricing is typically explicitly banned in option grants, yet in our sampled firms, 
the possibility of repricing the grant is outright ignored.  
  
Adjustments to the exercise price of outstanding options should not occur other 
than pursuant to a stock split, stock dividend or major corporate restructurings 
such as mergers.  
  
To go around repricing, companies may elect to grant new stock options without 
making any adjustment to underwater options. There are, however, other issues to 
consider. The two most significant ones are shareholder dilution and depletion of 
the stock plan's share reserve. By granting additional stock options without 
cancelling the underwater ones, the company will increase the dilution level of 
the plan. This increase will be most noticeable in the company's diluted earnings 
per share calculation, which publicly held companies are required to report in 
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their income statement. In fact, because of the lower option price, the newly 
granted stock options will actually be more dilutive to earnings per share than the 
underwater options are. In addition, granting stock options that were not 
originally anticipated could deplete the stock plan's share reserve sooner than the 
company originally expected. 
 
Multiple grants may be an efficient remedy against repricing. When employees 
receive only one grant during their employment, all their options are at one price 
and a single decline in stock value places all those optoins underwater. If 
employees were to receive multiple grants, then a decline in share price might 
place some of their stock options underwater but others might still be in-the-
money. And, if subsequent options are granted on a regular basis, employees may 
anticipate receiving a new stock option while the stock value is low. Of course, 
this type of program often requires smaller new hire grants (so that shares remain 
available to cover ongoing grants), which could be problematic if the company 
relies heavily on new-hire grants for recruitment. Also, granting more frequently 
would significantly increase the level of administration associated with the plan.  
 
Despite receiving fierce criticism, repricing has been modelled as an optimal 
compensation policy in Acharya, John, and Sundaram (2000) and previously in 
Saly (1994). We hereby share the view that options that are out-of-the-money 
may give too high risk-taking incentives. While options provide managers with 
incentives to increase stock price, they also add incentives to increase risk. 
Declining stock prices typically increase risk-taking incentives as a proportion of 
value-increasing incentives. Nonetheless, the claim that if risk-taking incentives 
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are sufficiently high relative to incentives to increase share price, options may 
induce to invest in risk-increasing, negative NPV projects, is at least debatable. 
The choice of negative NPV projects is not consistent with the risk-averse 
manager hypothesis assumed in this study. We argue that stock options are 
granted to align the incentives –among those, the risk preferences- of risk-averse 
managers and risk-neutral shareholders. In spite of the risk-shifting incentives 
provided by stock options, the opportunity cost of risk-averse managers is likely 
to be high enough to reject negative NPV projects. The use of repricing to 
alleviate such incentives would therefore be redundant. 
 
The impact on repricing of newly issued accounting rules remains to be observed. 
Formerly, when option expensing was not mandatory, companies were required to 
account for the repriced stock options using variable-plan accounting 
methodologies. Under variable-plan accounting, the company recognized 
compensation expense equal to the excess of the fair market value over the strike 
price. The company recorded the estimated compensation expense each 
accounting period and at the time the option was exercised, expired or cancelled, 
the firm recorded a final adjustment to reconcile the actual compensation expense 
determined at this time with the previous estimates. To bypass variable-plan 
accounting, the company would have needed to wait six months before granting 
any new stock options that had a strike price lower than the cancelled options. 
The fact that repriced options could not avoid the hit to earnings –as opposed to 
near universal at-the-money grants- was likely to be a persuasive reason for 
publicly held firms to avoid repricing. Now that expensing is compulsory, the 
burden is lifted and some companies might be tempted to allow repricing on fears 
of weakened –or lost- incentives. Such is however unlikely to be the case for our 
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sample firms, highly scrutinized and subject to increasing shareholder activism 
that largely opposes repricing.  
 
When tumbling stock prices are due to factors beyond managerial control, 
repricing does not seem an efficient incentive-alignment response either. 
Alternatively, indexing –as discussed in section 8.2.3- does a better job from an 
incentive-contracting perspective, by strictly compensating management-driven 
performance, rewarding better-than-the-index outcomes both in bullish and 
bearish markets.  
 
In sum, repricing curbs incentives to work harder ex-ante, and implies a transfer 
of wealth from shareholders to –often poorly performing- managers ex-post. To 
that extent, Ibex 35 systematic proscription of repricing signals that as far as this 
controversial mechanism, optimal contracting principles seem to prevail over 
self-serving managerial behavior. 
 
8.6 Trading restrictions 
 
Limiting the disposal of shares acquired upon exercising stock options reinforces 
the goal congruence between managers and shareholders. However, from a risk 
bearing perspective, stock options add a dead weight cost to the undiversified 
manager. By having her pay linked to the company’s stock, the optionee ends up 
overexposed to firm-specific risk, as both her human capital and investment 
portfolio are tied to the company’s wealth. As a result, the employee may hedge 
against the firm’s risk. Conversely, the employer would like to make 
compensation contingent on firm value, arguably stock options’ ultimate goal. 
Therefore, it is of interest to analyze the investment decision problem of the 
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agent, and the optimal restriction on her portfolio holdings that could be 
implemented in order to choose the most efficient contract design.  
 
The burden on trading the acquired shares following stock option exercise offers 
ample room for creativity in the design of compensation contracts. Restrictions 
are typically time-based and in some cases limited to part –not all- of the shares 
acquired. Looking at comparable evidence –notably US large caps-, trading 
restrictions are at times sweetened, as in the case of Dupont, which granted 
reload options (referred to in section 8.2 above) upon the exercise of its options 
with the condition that shares received from the exercise were held for at least 2 
years. Or IBM, which combined the choice of strike price with the vesting 
schedule and a stock ownership enhancing feature -the company only grants at-
the-money options to those who agree to first purchase IBM stock from a portion 
of their annual cash incentive awards, and such options vest in three years if the 
optionee holds the underlying purchased stock. 
 
If required to hold the shares acquired on stock option exercise, the employee 
might be induced into a (private) portfolio allocation not necessarily matching 
her risk preferences. Depending on opportunity costs, such a burden could 
severely penalize the stock option payoff. Thus, minimum holding periods are 
likely to apply to the option gain –the net shares after covering for the strike 
price and withholding taxes. If the option exercise is settled by issuing the net 
shares, the minimum holding requirement on the option gain would result in less 
shares issued and in turn, less dilution.  
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Among Ibex 35 firms, five explicitly set up trading limits in connection to 
exercised options. Time restrictions ranged from a 1 to 3-year minimum holding 
periods. Unión Fenosa called for the net gain shares acquired on stock option 
exercise to be held for one year. Iberdrola in turn lifted the bar by imposing a 2-
year trading ban on net shares, while Gamesa allowed up to 50 percent of the net 
profit shares to be sold after 2 years and the rest after 3 years following option 
exercise. Metrovacesa stood apart by linking future to past option exercises. It 
made the exercise of options contingent on holding shares acquired through 
previous grants. Under its 3-year plan, the company made annual grants of in-
the-money options. To exercise the options in the second (and third) year, the 
optionee had to hold at least 90 percent of the shares received on the exercise of 
the previous year’s options. Another creative design choice was that of FCC, 
which linked the option payout to the obligation to purchase shares and hold 
them for a minimum of one year.  
 
Even if a minimum holding period may be a powerful means towards increased 
incentive alignment and enhanced shareholder value, a similar outcome could be 
reached by the interplay of the contractual terms hereby studied. Just as a burden 
on trading provides a post-exercise handcuff that boosts the time value of 
options, a longer vesting period would yield a comparable outcome. The longer 
the manager’s wealth is linked to firm value, the less likely she is to engage in 
self-serving behaviour. Even if managers would not be indifferent between a 
portfolio of fully vested shares and one of unvested options (Table 3, page 61), 
both prompt them to act as owners. The choice of a shorter vesting schedule 
coupled with tighter trading constraints, relative to a longer lock-up period 
combined with loose post-exercise trading limits would be similarly efficient 
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from an incentive-contracting standpoint. Such inverse relationship between 
vesting and trading restrictions –shorter vesting coupled with trading limits or 
longer vesting with lighter or no trading restrictions- appears to be the formula 
followed by our sample firms. Option contracts in Ibex 35 firms vest on average 
after 2.6 years but only 4 out of the 22 plans set minimum holding periods for 
shares acquired on option exercise.  
 
The option maturity plays a somehow secondary role in the trade-off between 
vesting and post-exercise restrictions. According to Ofek and Yermack (2000), 
option holders tend to exercise their rights soon after vesting. Such an 
assumption reinforces the need for a burden on trading following option exercise, 
as otherwise the free disposal of shares allows the employee to unwind the 
incentives built in equity-based pay way before maturity. 
 
An incentive-alignment design is therefore likely to choose between more trading 
restrictions in response to less (faster) vesting and less trading limits for longer 
vesting periods. Deviations for this optimal contracting equilibrium would 
suggest some degree of managerial power embedded in the compensation 
contract. Opportunistic managers would advocate for faster vesting and no post-
exercise trading limits so as to maximize their expected option gain. Diligent 
boards would in turn favor one of choices noted above –longer vesting with 
lower trading restrictions or shorter vesting combined with a retention feature. 
Arm’s length bargaining between management and board trying to optimize their 
respective utility functions would likely render a compensation agreement shaped 
by a blend of optimal contracting and managerial power. How much of each 
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ingredient would be a function of factors –such as board composition- beyond the 
scope of this empirical study.   
 
The next section builds on this critical review of current and past Ibex 35 stock 
option plans, to develop quantitative evidence of the value of incentive-aligning 
contracts, materialized in higher risk-adjusted returns for firms that favor optimal 
contracting. This rather intuitive claim is largely missing empirical evidence to 
back it up, and such has indeed been the gap in the literature that triggered this 
study.  
 
9. Data Analysis - Modeling the Stock Option Contract  
 
If the choice of compensation is to be managed as an investment decision, risk-
averse managers and risk-neutral shareholders would like to avoid short-term, 
zero-sum, rent-extracting outcomes and revisit the potential upside of equity-
based pay, particularly of well-designed stock option contracts. But what do we 
mean by a ‘well-designed’ contract? As firms pursue different talent attraction, 
retention and motivation goals, the answer is likely to be firm-specific. Yet if a 
positive relationship is shown between higher returns and stock options as a 
component of the pay package in the first place, that would be a big step forward 
in reaching a mutually convenient labor contract, as both employee and employer 
would share in the share price appreciation. But is awarding stock options 
enough of a sign for the market to reward the firm with a hike in the share price? 
Wouldn’t a contract that induces the manager to make better choices to enhance 
firm value –and her own utility as current or future shareholder- be preferred? 
Basic valuation models suggest that if the future value of the firm is expected to 
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be higher as a result of those improved managerial choices, its present value –the 
share price- should reflect those future gains. So a stock option contract that 
prompts managers to make those better choices would be a ‘well-designed’ 
contract.  
 
This section attempts to capture the relationship between share prices gains and 
the stock option award in the first place, and eventually between those gains and 
the design of the contract, as disclosed to the market. If the previous section has 
provided qualitative insights to the research questions, i.e. the design of Ibex 35 
option plans show a blend of optimal contracting and managerial power, then this 
section aims at providing quantitative inputs to test the hypotheses developed in 
section 5.6. For that panel data analysis is applied, to estimate the regresssion 
coefficients that stand for higher returns to the award of options in the first 
place, and eventually to the award of incentive-aligment options.  
 
Panel data analysis is a statiscal method that builds on a two-dimensional data set 
collected over time and over the same individuals, followed by a regression run 
over these two dimensions, so as to explore relationships between them. 
 
As risk and return should be factored in when pricing risky assets such as Ibex 35  
stocks, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), sketched in the unpublished 
work of Treynor (1961) and widely disseminated by Sharpe (1964), would be 
applied to draw up the regression equation: 
 
        Ri = Rfree + Rp * Betai + Error  (equation 1) 
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where: 
 
Ri stands for the expected risk-adjusted return of the stock i  
Rfree is the proxy for the risk-free rate 
Rp is the the generic risk premium, as measured by the difference between the 
overall market return and the risk-free rate 
Betai is the firm’s systematic risk factor that adjusts the risk premium 
 
The inputs to the CAPM equation above are computed over the 1995-2013 time 
window for the sampled Ibex 35 firms granting stock options. As noted earlier, it 
was in the mid-90s that stock option compensation began to gain momentum 
among Ibex 35 firms, while the 2013 cut-off date allows updating the debate on 
contract design to the latest reliable data, on top of accounting for the impact of 
the 2007-08 global financial crisis. Narrowing the scope to Ibex 35 stock option 
plans notably implied a trade-off by ignoring plans granted by firms not listed in 
the index –or not in the index when granting- for the sake of drawing conclusions 
with some degree of generalizability –at least for large, liquid Spanish firms.  
 
So the first step is to compute return figures for the sampled firms out of 
observed stock market prices. The table below summarizes those return inputs for 
the sampled Ibex 35 granting firms: 
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Firm 
First 
observation 
Last 
observation 
Minimum 
(basis  
points)  
Maximum 
(bp) 
Mean 
(bp) 
St Dev 
(basis  
points)  Asymmetry Curtosis  
ARCELOR 10.12.1997 15.03.2013 -2146,87 2469,16 0,64 278,05 0,25 11,49 
ABERTIS 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1091,48 1147,96 3,62 159,29 0,05 6,3 
ACCIONA 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1398,57 1545,93 3,59 219,03 -0,04 8,57 
ACS 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1494,32 1629,06 5,31 195,81 0,21 8,36 
ALTADIS 02.01.1995 22.02.2008 -989,95 1547,75 7,43 175,81 0,23 7,82 
AMADEUS 23.12.1999 15.12.2005 -2083,1 1335,31 -2,83 286,81 -0,16 8,14 
AMPER 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1466,1 2293,1 -0,16 255,58 0,55 7,99 
SANTANDER 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1602,48 2087,74 2,07 225,32 0,11 9,16 
BANKINTER 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1238,99 1396,67 1,7 213,91 0,46 7,4 
CORP FINAN ALBA 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1050,71 1105,1 3,89 191,03 -0,04 5,89 
FERROVIAL 26.10.2004 15.03.2013 -1203,13 1328,83 2,59 219,84 0,05 6,56 
GRUPO_FERROVIAL 05.05.1999 03.12.2009 -994,29 1181,53 1,11 227,73 0,03 5,27 
GAMESA 31.10.2000 15.03.2013 -2522,66 1994,89 -3,21 279,75 -0,14 10,34 
GAS_NATURAL 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1406,14 1151,98 2,59 192,68 0,01 6 
IBERDROLA 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1344,08 1722,58 2,6 175,6 0,29 12,28 
IAG_IBERIA 02.04.2001 15.03.2013 -1351,75 2345,07 3,21 247,63 0,49 9,27 
INDITEX 23.05.2001 15.03.2013 -2187,86 1231,88 5,8 195,58 -0,38 12,93 
INDRA 23.03.1999 15.03.2013 -1222,9 1395,18 2,2 200,76 0,24 6,92 
MEDIASET 23.06.2004 15.03.2013 -1474,02 1674,38 -2,1 247,49 0,01 6,44 
METROVACESA 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -2496,55 9793,22 -0,7 338,81 8,69 213,76 
NH_HOTELES 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -2507,01 1685,46 0,71 252,99 -0,01 11,74 
PRISA 28.06.2000 15.03.2013 -1713,58 2962,66 -14,19 318,31 0,83 11,82 
REPSOL 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -1714,31 1180,17 1,9 182,99 -0,06 8,75 
SOGECABLE 21.07.1999 19.06.2008 -1398,2 1410,63 0,04 279,77 0,23 6,64 
TELEFONICA 02.01.1995 15.03.2013 -988,64 1326,26 3,27 189,56 0,12 6,39 
TELEFONICA_MOV 21.11.2000 31.07.2006 -990,14 971,64 -0,22 184,52 0,23 5,56 
UNION_FENOSA 02.01.1995 04.09.2009 -4248,4 1521,92 5,47 187,58 -3,26 81,29 
ZELTIA 10.01.1995 15.03.2013 -4254,34 2966,94 5,18 312,98 0,11 20,35 
 
Table 9 – Summary of 1995-2013 returns for granting Ibex 35 firms  
Source:  Own elaboration 
 
Returns for the sampled firms are computed as daily values –same for the risk-
free rate input to the CAPM equation. The proxy hereby chosen for the risk-free 
rate is the EONIA, which stands for Euro Overnight Index Average, calculated as 
the one-day interbank rate. 
 
It is worthwhile recalling that expected returns as measured by the CAPM 
account for the risk-premium (return of the market portfolio over the risk-free 
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rate), adjusted by the firm’s systematic risk coefficient (the firm’s Beta), and 
added to that risk-free basis. Yet even the risk-free rate, presumably independent 
from firm-specific risk, is to some extent impacted by the firm’s perceived risk. 
Hence, it is argued that the risk-free rate for a given firm is composed of the 
overall market risk-free rate plus a term hereby called Alfa, that captures the 
premium or discount that a given firm adds to the market risk-free rate. Alfa is 
defined as that excess –in absolute terms, positive or negative- over the risk-free, 
attributable to the firm, that is to say, whether the firm is adding any additional 
return over that market risk-free rate –below. 
 
Rfree = Rfree (market) + Alfai                (equation 2) 
 
As the model intends to adjust for market-driven returns, so as to isolate and 
estimate only full firm-driven profitability, the overall market risk-free rate is 
substracted from both sides of equation 1 above. The risk-free rate, which is not 
constant over time, is therefore removed from the right-hand side of the equation, 
leaving for estimation the firm-driven return (the risk-premium adjusted by the 
firm’s beta, plus the Alfa noted above). Hence the firm’s return is defined as the 
excess return over the risk-free, fully driven by the value of the firm’s Beta and 
the Alfa. That is equation 3 below: 
 
Ri - Rfree = Alfai + Rp * Betai + Error  (equation 3) 
 
Alfa is most likely to equal 0 –no premia, as firms are typically unable to 
consistently generate risk-free returns over the prevailing risk-free rate.  
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The values for Alfa and Beta for each firm are computed by means of a linear 
regression, whereby the firm-specific, excess return of the stock (Ri - Rfree, 
equation 3) is plotted relative to the risk premium (Rmarket minus the Rfree). The 
slope of the regression curve accounts for the firm’s Beta coefficient that adjusts 
the generic risk premium, whereas the intercept is the Alfa, for each of the 
sampled firms. The values are initially computed for the sampled firms without 
stock option plans.  
 
The table below summarizes the values for Alfa and Beta for the sampled firms 
out of the regression above (equation 3). The values for Alfa, when netting out 
the standard deviation, are indeed close to 0, as expected. Only Altadis, Inditex 
and Prisa come out significant, although at different confidence levels. The 
positive sign of Altadis and Inditex suggest that the market gives a premium 
topping the overall risk-free rate for these stocks, standing for a positive 
assessment of these firms, which baseline for computing the expected return (the 
CAPM) is placed at a higher starting point –the intercept (Alfa) is higher than 0 
and significant. Conversely, the negative sign of Prisa points at a negative 
market assessment, meaning that when computing the CAPM expected return for 
the stock, the starting point (the Alfa intercept) is below 0, as the stock 
contributes negatively, at a discount, to the market risk-free rate. The values for 
Beta are all positive, around 1 and significant –at 99 percent confidence-, as 
expected by the model.  
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empresa #obs. alfa beta desv.tip. R2 Estad. F 
ARCELOR 3860 0.17 (3.70)_ 0.99 (0.02)*** 230.15 31.5 886.64 *** 
ABERTIS 4602 2.11 (1.80)_ 0.68 (0.01)*** 121.93 41.42 1625.39 *** 
ACCIONA 4600 1.75 (2.65)_ 0.83 (0.02)*** 179.84 32.6 1111.26 *** 
ACS 4561 3.62 (2.36)_ 0.75 (0.02)*** 159.35 33.78 1162.52 *** 
ALTADIS 3309 5.54 (2.89)* 0.43 (0.02)*** 166.1 10.77 199.5 *** 
AMADEUS 1521 -2.11 (6.40)_ 1.01 (0.05)*** 249.57 24.34 243.97 *** 
AMPER 4602 -1.75 (3.42)_ 0.72 (0.02)*** 231.69 17.84 499.06 *** 
SANTANDER 4601 -0.87 (1.56)_ 1.32 (0.01)*** 105.97 77.89 8095.29 *** 
BANKINTER 4601 -0.4 (2.36)_ 0.94 (0.02)*** 160.1 44 1805.62 *** 
CORPORACION_FINANCIERA_ALBA 4602 2.27 (2.31)_ 0.73 (0.02)*** 156.69 32.74 1119.01 *** 
FERROVIAL 2136 2.39 (3.50)_ 0.94 (0.02)*** 161.91 45.78 900.21 *** 
GRUPO_FERROVIAL 2671 0.52 (3.58)_ 0.9 (0.02)*** 185.08 33.97 686 *** 
GAMESA 3132 -2.59 (4.03)_ 1.05 (0.03)*** 225.32 35.15 847.64 *** 
GAS_NATURAL 4602 0.84 (2.24)_ 0.79 (0.01)*** 151.97 37.81 1397.74 *** 
IBERDROLA 4602 0.8 (1.86)_ 0.81 (0.01)*** 126.44 48.16 2136.07 *** 
IAG_IBERIA 3029 3.41 (3.89)_ 0.79 (0.02)*** 214.21 25.2 509.43 *** 
INDITEX 2995 6.06 (2.95)** 0.7 (0.02)*** 161.5 31.83 698.34 *** 
INDRA 3536 2.45 (2.79)_ 0.73 (0.02)*** 166.02 31.63 817.02 *** 
MEDIASET_COMUNICACION 2223 -2.36 (4.20)_ 0.95 (0.03)*** 197.93 36.07 625.91 *** 
METROVACESA 4601 -1.62 (4.91)_ 0.41 (0.03)*** 333.14 3.34 79.44 *** 
NH_HOTELES 4601 -1.02 (3.31)_ 0.77 (0.02)*** 224.46 21.3 622.14 *** 
PRISA 3220 -13.53 (4.82)*** 1.03 (0.03)*** 273.7 26.09 567.53 *** 
REPSOL 4602 -0.02 (1.90)_ 0.86 (0.01)*** 128.85 50.43 2338.69 *** 
SOGECABLE 2244 -1.08 (5.06)_ 1.09 (0.04)*** 239.63 26.67 407.36 *** 
TELEFONICA 4602 0.91 (1.51)_ 1.06 (0.01)*** 102.13 70.98 5622.64 *** 
TELEFONICA_MOVILES 1428 -1.6 (3.52)_ 0.95 (0.03)*** 133.1 48.01 657.44 *** 
UNION_FENOSA 3698 3.52 (2.79)_ 0.56 (0.02)*** 169.34 18.52 419.88 *** 
ZELTIA 4056 3.4 (4.60)_ 0.68 (0.03)*** 292.93 12.42 287.42 *** 
 
Table 10 –CAPM computation  
Source:  Own elaboration. 
 
Then the stock option plan add-on to the pay package, i.e. whether the firm 
awards stock options- is introduced, in order to identify the impact on both Alfa 
and Beta of such change. So values for the differences –with and without stock 
option plans- are computed, where Alfa_so and Beta_so represent the change in 
Alfa and Beta respectively, when a stock option plan is in place.  
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The equation set to capture the sensitivity of risk-adjusted returns to firm-
specific factors, following the introduction of the stock option plan, is presented 
below: 
 
    Ri -Rfree=(Alfai+Alfai_so*SO)+(Betai+Betai_so*SO)*Rp+Error (equation 4) 
 
The introduction of the stock option plan is priced by the market, generating a 
change in the valuation of Alfa, represented by the add-on Alfa_so adjusted by 
the dummy SO, which is 1 when the firm has a stock option plan and 0 when it 
doesn’t. The same applies to the pricing of Beta, adding the term (Betai_so) that 
measures the change resulting from the stock option plan, adjusted by the 
dummy SO. As argued in the CAPM model, Beta, now factoring in the stock 
option plan, adjusts the risk premium Rp (the difference between the return of 
the market portfolio and the risk-free rate).  
 
So equation 4 is set to test the claim that there is a change in the firm’s risk-
adjusted returns as a result of the introduction of the stock option plan.  
 
The regression is run to compute the values for the intercept, adjusted by the 
stock option plan, and the values for the systematic risk Beta coefficient, also 
adjusted by the introduction of the plan. Initially, a single regression is run, 
computing generic estimates for Alfa, Alfa_so y Beta_so. The underlying 
assumption is that the market assessment of having stock options, as measured by 
the complementors to the CAPM model (Alfa, Alfa_so y Beta_so) is alike for all 
firms. That means single values for the estimates, adding to the firm-specific 
beta. The regression output is presented below: 
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Variable Coeficient 
Alfa 1.02 (0.80)_ 
Alfa_SO -1.10 (1.22)_ 
Beta_SO 0.03 (0.01)*** 
beta_ARCELOR 0.97 (0.02)*** 
beta_ABERTIS 0.67 (0.02)*** 
beta_ACCIONA 0.82 (0.02)*** 
beta_ACS 0.73 (0.02)*** 
beta_ALTADIS 0.42 (0.03)*** 
beta_AMADEUS 0.99 (0.04)*** 
beta_AMPER 0.71 (0.02)*** 
beta_SANTANDER 1.29 (0.02)*** 
beta_BANKINTER 0.94 (0.02)*** 
beta_CORPORACION_FINANCIERA_ALBA 0.71 (0.02)*** 
beta_FERROVIAL 0.91 (0.03)*** 
beta_GRUPO_FERROVIAL 0.88 (0.03)*** 
beta_GAMESA 1.03 (0.02)*** 
GAS_NATURAL 0.78 (0.02)*** 
IBERDROLA 0.80 (0.02)*** 
IAG_IBERIA 0.78 (0.02)*** 
INDITEX 0.69 (0.02)*** 
INDRA 0.70 (0.02)*** 
MEDIASET_COMUNICACION 0.92 (0.03)*** 
METROVACESA 0.40 (0.02)*** 
NH_HOTELES 0.76 (0.02)*** 
PRISA 1.03 (0.02)*** 
REPSOL 0.86 (0.02)*** 
SOGECABLE 1.09 (0.03)*** 
TELEFONICA 1.05 (0.02)*** 
TELEFONICA_MOVILES 0.93 (0.04)*** 
UNION_FENOSA 0.54 (0.02)*** 
ZELTIA 0.68 (0.02)*** 
# obs. 102837 
 R2 30.51 
 Error St. Dev. 193.64 
 F stat 22578.05 *** 
 
     Table 11 –CAPM w/ and w/o SO for all firms  
           
           Source:  Own elaboration 
 
In this aggregate format, in which the pricing of having or not having a stock 
option plan is not firm-specific but generic, the estimates for Alfa and  Alfa_so 
come out not significant and close to 0 –as expected- when netting out their 
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standard deviation. Instead, the estimate for Beta_so is positive and significant, 
suggesting that the beta goes up when stock options are awarded, hence 
amplifying the adjustment on the risk premium and as a result the expected return 
on the firm stock. So granting stock options does make a difference for the firm, 
adjusting its risk-adjusted returns upwards. But is the magnitude of that 
difference generic, or does it vary from firm to firm?  
 
If arguing that the added value from granting or not granting stock options is 
priced differently by the market depending on the company, then a separate 
regression has to be run for each firm to compute individual values for the 
estimates. The table below shows the regression output, including the standard 
deviation of the portion not explained by the model, computed separately for the 
days in which the firm had a stock option plan in place (St Dev SO) and those in 
which there was no plan (St Dev NO). Other than the case of Mediaset, which 
high significancy is likely to be the result of the stock option plan being active 
almost all along the sampled period, generating a case of weak multicollinearity 
that reduces the precision of the estimation, there is not sufficient evidence that 
the values of Alfa, with and without the add-on resulting from awarding stock 
options (Alfa and Alfa_so), are significantly different from 0. Regarding the 
values for Beta, the regression output shows a high number of significant 
coefficients, suggesting that stock option plans do affect the beta of the firm and 
in turn its expected returns. Nevertheless, the sign and magnitude of the change 
vary along the sample. It is then is relevant to further explore whether the 
identified changes in the beta estimates –as reflected by the different signs and 
magnitudes- relate to the design features of the plan. 
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Company #obs. alfa alfa_so beta beta_so Error St Dev R2 F Stat St Dev No St Dev SO F Stat 
ARCELOR 3860 1.3 (6.04)_ -2 (7.56)_ 0.65 (0.04)*** 0.58 (0.05)*** 225.73 34.11 998.15 *** 236.94 219.42 1.17 *** 
ABERTIS 4602 3.2 (2.17)_ -2.2 (3.83)_ 0.59 (0.02)*** 0.18 (0.02)*** 121.16 42.16 1675.62 *** 121.56 120.55 1.02 
 
ACCIONA 4600 3.88 (3.00)_ -9.5 (6.39)_ 0.79 (0.02)*** 0.13 (0.04)*** 179.6 32.78 1120.44 *** 183.7 164.81 1.24 *** 
ACS 4561 4.31 (4.60)_ -1 (5.36)_ 0.78 (0.03)*** -0.03 (0.04)_ 159.34 33.79 1163.05 *** 182.69 150.21 1.48 *** 
ALTADIS 3309 4.1 (3.84)_ 1.69 (5.75)_ 0.61 (0.03)*** -0.37 (0.04)*** 164.3 12.69 240.27 *** 173.77 151.95 1.31 *** 
AMADEUS 1521 10.11 (22.70)_ -13 (23.65)_ 1.54 (0.15)*** -0.58 (0.16)*** 248.48 24.99 252.73 *** 389.76 233.5 2.79 *** 
SANTANDER 4601 -1.07 (3.00)_ 0.56 (3.51)_ 1.25 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.03)*** 105.84 77.94 8121.56 *** 123.91 98.32 1.59 *** 
BANKINTER 4601 -0.51 (2.58)_ 0.28 (6.40)_ 0.94 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.08)_ 160.09 44 1806.14 *** 170.78 88.11 3.76 *** 
CORPORACION_FI
NANCIERA_ 
ALBA 4602 3.02 (2.62)_ -3.2 (5.56)_ 0.72 (0.02)*** 0.01 (0.03)_ 156.68 32.75 1119.34 *** 158.05 152.26 1.08 * 
FERROVIAL 2671 4.15 (5.02)_ -8.3 (6.89)_ 0.56 (0.03)*** 0.7 (0.05)*** 177.75 39.1 856.14 *** 183.27 173.11 1.12 ** 
GAMESA 3132 -7.39 (7.26)_ 7.31 (8.72)_ 1.15 (0.04)*** -0.18 (0.05)*** 224.83 35.43 858.11 *** 259.48 208.09 1.55 *** 
GAS_NATURAL 4602 0.66 (2.59)_ 0.32 (4.96)_ 0.88 (0.02)*** -0.4 (0.04)*** 149.87 39.51 1501.93 *** 156.05 132.32 1.39 *** 
IBERDROLA 4602 0.1 (1.95)_ 1.47 (4.83)_ 0.92 (0.01)*** -0.62 (0.03)*** 121.13 52.43 2533.57 *** 124.83 100.54 1.54 *** 
IAG_IBERIA 3029 4.01 (6.01)_ -1.4 (7.88)_ 0.73 (0.03)*** 0.17 (0.05)*** 213.82 25.46 516.75 *** 240.79 192.5 1.56 *** 
INDITEX 2995 7.97 (3.87)** -4.4 (5.97)* 0.73 (0.02)*** -0.11 (0.04)*** 161.31 32 703.69 *** 150.33 175.77 1.37 *** 
MEDIASET_ 
COMUNICACION 2223 134.6 (41.10)*** -138 (41.32)*** 2.88 (0.60)*** -1.94 (0.61)*** 197.14 36.58 639.84 *** 358.87 195.33 3.38 *** 
METROVACESA 4601 -3.78 (5.36)_ 12.2 (13.30)_ 0.46 (0.04)*** -0.26 (0.08)*** 332.74 3.57 85.18 *** 354.64 183.62 3.73 *** 
NH_HOTELES 4601 2.53 (4.94)_ -6.2 (6.65)_ 0.71 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.04)*** 224.25 21.45 627.51 *** 236.58 213.98 1.22 *** 
PRISA 3220 -14.4 (5.81)** 3.37 (10.42)* 1.05 (0.03)*** -0.13 (0.09)* 273.62 26.13 568.94 *** 316.75 137.5 5.31 *** 
REPSOL 4602 0.39 (2.24)_ -1.5 (4.24)_ 0.87 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.03)_ 128.84 50.44 2339.71 *** 129.73 126.8 1.05 
 
SOGECABLE 2244 -3.51 (6.20)_ 7.25 (10.76)_ 1.09 (0.04)*** 0.01 (0.12)_ 239.6 26.69 407.67 *** 268.68 168.38 2.55 *** 
TELEFONICA 4602 2.62 (1.88)_ -4.2 (2.95)_ 0.93 (0.01)*** 0.4 (0.02)*** 98.16 73.19 6276.85 *** 93 105.38 1.28 *** 
TELEFONICA_ 
MOVILES 1428 -0.88 (6.43)_ -0.9 (7.68)_ 1 (0.04)*** -0.08 (0.05)_ 132.98 48.1 659.77 *** 170.5 113.77 2.25 *** 
UNION_FENOSA 3698 4.06 (3.54)_ -1.5 (5.73)_ 0.57 (0.03)*** -0.03 (0.04)_ 169.32 18.54 420.33 *** 166.94 173.47 1.08 * 
ZELTIA 4056 6.75 (5.32)_ -13 (10.58)_ 0.65 (0.03)*** 0.13 (0.07)_ 292.74 12.54 290.43 *** 313.17 222.56 1.98 *** 
 
Table 12 – CAPM w/ and w/o SO for each firm  
Source:  Own elaboration 
 
In the next step, we assess the contractual drivers of option value –strike price, 
vesting, maturity, repricing and trading restrictions. They were identified and 
discussed in the critical review of the literature, and appraised for the sampled 
firms in the preceding section 8. In order to develop a set of quantitative metrics 
to account for the interplay of optimal contracting and managerial power in the 
contract design, and feed the regression equation as explanatory variables to the 
changes in expected returns, a grading scheme for each of the five terms is 
hereby constructed.  
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So how does the market assess the choice of strike price set for the option plan? 
And the choice of vesting? And the maturity of the grant? And what if repricing 
is allowed? And what about setting restrictions on trading the acquired shares? 
The answers to these queries are likely to be company-specific, i.e. a different 
impact on returns would be expected for instance for Gamesa relative to 
Ferrovial. On top of that, since the choices of design are likely to be highly 
correlated in explaining the degree of optimal contracting and/or managerial 
power built in the plan –the fairly common issue of multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables of a multiple regression-, separate regressions are to be run 
to get the estimates for each of the five terms. The equations will then be as 
follows: 
For the strike price: 
Ri-Rfree=(Alfai+Alfai_strike)+(Betai+Betai_strike)*Rp+Error (equation 5a) 
For vesting: 
Ri-Rfree=(Alfai+Alfai_vest)+(Betai+Betai_vest)*Rp+Error   (equation 5b) 
For maturity: 
Ri -Rfree=(Alfai+Alfai_mat)+(Betai+Betai_mat)*Rp+Error   (equation 5c) 
For repricing: 
Ri -Rfree=(Alfai+Alfai_repr)+(Betai+Betai_repr)*Rp+Error  (equation 5d) 
and for trading restrictions: 
Ri -Rfree=(Alfai+Alfai_trad)+(Betai+Betai_trad)*Rp+Error  (equation 5e) 
 
That means that the expected firm-specific returns of i (the dependent term Ri - 
Rfree) are potentially a function of the Alfai estimate, plus the add-on to that 
Alfai resulting from the choice of strike price, plus the Betai and the complement 
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to that Betai that combined adjust the risk premium, plus the error term. The same 
logic applies to the other four choices of design. And each will likely get a 
different assessment of the complements to Alfa and Beta to explain the 
sensitivity of returns to those estimates. So five different equations for each of 
the sampled firms, looking for the sign and significancy of the coefficients.  
 
For that, we need graded values for each of the design features, accounting for 
the different shades of optimal contracting and/or managerial power. Such 
grading scheme is presented below: 
 
Strike price  Grade 
In-the-money 1 
At-the-money 2 
At-the-money (averaged) 3 
Out-of-the-money  4 
At-the-money (with performance requirement) 5 
Indexed price 6 
 
Table 13 – Strike price grading range  
Source:  Own elaboration 
 
The more the strike price moves away from in-the-money or the conventional 
fixed price at-the-money format, towards a (relative) performance-based exercise 
price scheme, the more optimal contracting prevails over managerial power in the 
pay-setting process.  
 
Vesting Grade 
Time vesting - cliff 1 
Time vesting - graded 2 
Price vesting 3 
Price & time vesting 4 
Performance & time vesting 5 
 
Table 14 – Vesting grading range  
Source:  Own elaboration 
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Drawing from the same rationale as that of the strike price, a contract design that 
favors performance vesting is set to more effectively align incentives relative to 
pure time-vesting schemes.  
  
Maturity Grade 
Maturity < 5 years & Vesting/Maturity < 0,5 1 
Maturity < 5 years & Vesting/Maturity ≥ 0,5 2 
Maturity ≥ 5 years & Vesting/Maturity < 0,5 3 
Maturity ≥ 5 years & Vesting/Maturity ≥ 0,5 4 
 
Table 15 – Maturity grading range  
Source:  Own elaboration 
 
The choice of maturitiy is here coupled with that of vesting, so as to unveil the 
likely powerplay between optimal contracting and managerial power in setting 
the exercise window of the option. Longer maturities may have little impact in 
stretching the alignment power of the option if the vesting period is not equally 
pushed forward, inducing the beneficiary to behave as owner for longer. So 
combining longer maturities with longer vesting, minimizing the exercise 
window –and with that the risk of the employee offloading the (promised) 
ownership tie that align incentives-, points at a higher dose of optimal 
contracting in the stock option plan.  
 
Repricing Grade 
Allowed 1 
Banned 2 
 
Table 16 – Repricing grading range  
Source:  Own elaboration 
 
When it comes to repricing, the dichotomy is fairly straightforward: allowing 
repricing of the grant, despite some marginal support in the literature, is likely to 
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signal a great deal of rent extraction to the optionee at the expense of 
shareholders, as discussed in section 6.5. 
 
Trading Restrictions Grade 
No trading restricitions 1 
Must hold < 0,5*acquired shares for < 
0,5*vesting period 2 
Must hold ≥ 0,5*acquired shares for < 
0,5*vesting period 3 
Must hold < 0,5*acquired shares for ≥ 
0,5*vesting period 4 
Must hold ≥ 0,5*acquired shares for ≥ 
0,5*vesting period 5 
 
Table 17 – Trading Restrictions grading range  
Source:  Own elaboration 
 
Requiring the beneficiary to hold on to the shares acquired upon exercising the 
option, may unleash a conflict of utilities between the employee that doesn’t 
want to overexpose herself to the unsystematic risk of the firm –having her 
human and financial capital largely tied to the company-, and the employer that 
aims at prolonging the ownership connection for increased incentive alignment. 
Yet the logic of incentive contracting lies in making the benefits of share 
ownership higher than the cost arising from lack of diversification. A similar 
outcome in terms of ownership ties -or promise thereof- may be achieved by 
lengthing the vesting period. The interplay of these two –trading restrictions and 
vesting-, along with the number of shares required to hold, may allow the parties 
to balance out their presumed optimal contracting and managerial power goals.  
 
Every Ibex 35 stock option plan was then graded, and those were the inputs that 
adjusted equation 5 above, for each of the contractual terms. The grades are 
summarized in the table below:  
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Company Grant Date Vesting  Maturity  Strike Repricing 
Trading 
restrictions 
ACCIONA, S.A. 31.3.2009 1 1 2 2 1 
ACCIONA, S.A. 31.3.2011 2 1 2 2 1 
ACS 17.12.1999 2 4 2 2 1 
ACS 02.07.2004 2 4 2 2 1 
ACS 1.4.2004 2 4 2 2 2 
ALTADIS 28.07.2000 1 4 3 2 1 
ALTADIS 04.06.2002 1 4 3 2 1 
AMADEUS 16.06.2000 2 3 3 2 1 
ARCELORMITTAL 08.07.2003 1 3 3 2 1 
ARCELORMITTAL 02.05.2008 2 3 2 2 1 
BANCO SANTANDER 30.12.1999 2 2 4 2 1 
BANCO SANTANDER 29.12.2000 2 2 4 2 1 
BANCO SANTANDER 15.1.2006 5 3 4 2 1 
BANKINTER 05.01.2004 1 1 2 2 1 
BANKINTER 25.01.2005 1 1 2 2 1 
BANKINTER 22.12.2005 1 1 2 2 1 
BBVA 25.07.2000 4 2 4 2 1 
CORP FIN ALBA 28.5.2008 1 2 2 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 16.10.2000 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 18.05.2001 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 29.07.2003 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 7.5.2004 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 30.09.2005 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 28.03.2006 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 31.03.2006 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 25.10.2006 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 26.10.2007 5 4 3 2 1 
FERROVIAL, S.A. 28.03.2008 5 4 3 2 1 
FCC 01.08.2008 1 4 3 2 3 
GAMESA  21.12.2000 5 2 3 2 5 
GAMESA  13.05.2005 4 3 3 2 1 
GAS NATURAL 17.01.2001 2 1 2 2 1 
GAS NATURAL 14.01.2002 2 1 2 2 1 
GAS NATURAL 13.01.2003 2 1 2 2 1 
IBERDROLA  16.06.2001 5 2 3 2 5 
IBERIA - IAG 09.04.2001 2 3 3 2 1 
IBERIA - IAG 03.04.2002 2 3 5 2 1 
IBERIA - IAG 04.04.2003 2 3 5 2 1 
INDITEX 27.04.2001 2 4 1 2 1 
INDRA 26.03.1999 4 2 2 2 1 
INDRA 12.06.2000 4 2 1 2 1 
INDRA 05.07.2002 2 2 3 2 1 
INDRA 30.06.2005 1 2 3 2 1 
INDRA 1.10.2008 1 2 3 2 1 
MAPFRE 01.06.2007 2 4 3 2 1 
MEDIASET  28.7.2004 1 4 2 2 1 
MEDIASET  7.9.2005 1 4 2 2 1 
MEDIASET  26.7.2006 1 4 2 2 1 
MEDIASET  25.7.2007 1 4 2 2 1 
MEDIASET  30.7.2008 1 4 2 2 1 
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MEDIASET  29.7.2009 1 4 2 2 1 
MEDIASET  28.7.2010 1 3 2 2 1 
MEDIASET  27.7.2011 1 3 2 2 1 
METROVACESA 22.03.2001 2 1 1 2 5 
NH HOTELES, S.A. 15.06.2001 2 4 3 2 1 
NH HOTELES, S.A. 28.04.2003 1 2 2 2 1 
NH HOTELES, S.A. 28.6.2007 1 2 3 2 1 
OHL 13.11.2007 1 4 2 2 1 
PRISA 16/7/2004 1 2 2 2 1 
REPSOL YPF 05.04.2001 2 4 2 2 1 
REPSOL YPF 17.05.2002 2 4 2 2 1 
SACYR 
VALLEHERMOSO 22.09.2000 1 3 2 2 1 
SOGECABLE 13.05.2003 1 2 2 2 1 
TELEFONICA, S.A. 28.06.1999 1 2 1 2 1 
TELEFONICA, S.A. 07.04.2000 1 2 1 2 1 
TELEFONICA, S.A. 1.12.2001 1 4 2 2 1 
TELEFONICA MOVILES 11.01.2002 2 2 2 2 1 
UNION FENOSA 22.09.1998 2 1 2 2 5 
UNION FENOSA 21.09.1999 2 1 2 2 5 
UNION FENOSA 18.05.2000 2 1 2 2 5 
ZELTIA 18.03.2005 1 2 2 2 1 
ZELTIA 30.03.2006 1 2 2 2 1 
 
Table 18 – Grading exercise – Ibex 35 SO plans  
Source:  Own elaboration 
 
Five different models are then estimated, where each value driver (strike price, 
vesting, maturity, repricing and trading restrictions) is analyzed separately –the 
output is presented in the table below: 
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Table 19 – CAPM model for each design feature  
Source:  Own elaboration 
 
The values for Alfa –both without plan (Alfai) and the complement adjusted for 
the specific design feature (e.g. Alfai_strike)- are non-significant, which is 
consistent with the results of the previous steps. So that means that neither 
awarding options per se nor the design of the contracts bear any impact on the 
company-specific risk-free component of expected returns.   
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As for the Betas, it could be argued that the design, as captured by the grading, 
does influence on the magnitude of the change in the coefficient. Four of the five 
estimates come out highly significant (at 99 percent confidence), meaning that 
the market does react to the contract design, which impacts the Beta and in turn 
the expected return. The estimate for value added by vesting does not come out 
significant, but the magnitude and sign (positive) are as expected. The estimates 
for maturity, strike and repricing come out significant with a high confidence 
level and the expected sign (positive, meaning that improved grading is very 
likely to drive the coefficient up, and as a result, expected returns, also up). The 
magnitude for these three estimates turned out to be the same –for each unit 
change in the grading scheme, the Beta increases by 0,02. In turn, the sign for 
trading restrictions come out negative, arguably as expected, since as the grading 
for restrictions goes up (longer and higher holding requirements), the value for 
the Beta goes down. That would be consistent with the claim that as the 
executive is restrained from selling the exercised shares, her risk aversion 
increases, i.e. she would not be interested in holding a stock with a higher beta. 
 
Summing up, the evidence that granting stock options is positively priced by the 
market by way of increased risk-adjusted returns answers the main research 
question and validates the hypothesis (H1) developed out it. That increase in the 
firm’s risk-adjusted returns suggests that stock options are an effective incentive-
alignment mechanism in large, liquid listed Spanish firms. The panel data 
analysis eventually shows that this positive impact is not homogeneous across all 
sampled firms but rather a function of the design of the stock option contract. 
The more optimal contracting prevails over managerial power in the pay-setting 
process, the more significant the impact on the firm’s risk-adjusted returns, 
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which addresses the issue raised in the complementary research question and the 
hypothesis (H2) articulated on the back of it.  
 
10. A Note on the Spanish Regulatory Framework 
 
A remarkably proactive regulatory approach to corporate governance has 
emerged in Spain. This is likely to come as a result of a relative lack of 
commitment on the side of companies to bind themselves by non-enforceable 
bodies like Codes of Best Practices and other recommendations of similar nature. 
The first of those Corporate Governance Codes was introduced in 1998 by the 
Spanish stock market –the Olivencia Code of Good Governance. It was voluntary 
–applying the ‘comply or explain’ principle, i.e. in the absence of compliance, 
the firm has the state why-, same as the one that followed –Informe Aldama, from 
2003. Dispersed best practices were later consolidated in the so-called Unified 
Code of Good Governance, also know as Informe Conthe, in 2006. Following the 
increased scrutiny that resulted from the 2007-08 global financial crisis, multiple 
recommendations led to another update of the Code promoted by the CNMV in 
2015, while others were made enforceable, such as the Ley 31/2014 on board 
composition and compensation disclosure.   
 
Corporate governance may be viewed as a financial decision, a means to compete 
for funding in the market. Disclosure is therefore needed for the market to assess 
and price the governance practices of the firm. As per the quality and quantity of 
information disclosed, corporate governance does not seem to rank high in 
corporate strategy for Spanish firms. That, in turn, might have triggered the need 
for an increased regulatory approach of enforceable nature.   
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When looking at American companies as a benchmark, given their more 
proactive, market-driven corporate governance system, the essence of firm 
governance as a source of competitive advantage –e.g. in the access to capital 
markets- becomes apparent. The higher comparative dispersion of capital in U.S. 
relative to Spanish firms is likely to account for a fair share of this difference, 
which in turn induces the former to rely more heavily on capital market 
financing. As a result, U.S. firms show a faster adoption of corporate governance 
best practices, particularly in terms of information disclosure. Accordingly, 
regulation is likely to come ‘from within’, often by means of tight listing 
requirements issued by the Stock Exchanges. As pointed out by La Porta et al 
(1999, 2000) and Anand (2005), corporate governance stands apart from the 
command and control model of established legal regimes, by enabling companies 
to design and structure their own practices, within certain boundaries.  
 
Even if corporate scandals may suggest the lack of more active, preventive 
ruling, increased regulation implies a trade-off between certainty –proper of its 
mandatory nature- and curbing the initiative and often broader scope of self-
regulated agents.  
 
10.1 Business Law Perspective   
 
It was not until 1999 (Ley 55/1999) that stock options were granted long-awaited 
attention by the Spanish regulator. The new ruling modified the Ley 24/1988 (Ley 
del Mercado de Valores) and the so-called Ley de Sociedades Anónimas-Texto 
Refundido (LSA) passed in 1989 (Real Decreto Legislativo 1564/1989). It was 
further developed in 2000 by the Real Decreto 1370/2000 and the Circular 
4/2000 issued by the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV). Triggered 
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by the controversy raised by alleged abuses on the stock option plan of the 
Telefónica telecommunications company, it enhanced much needed disclosure 
around stock option grants. 
 
The Ley 55/1999 introduced significant improvements on shareholder monitoring 
over stock option programs. It added a second paragraph to article 130 of the 
LSA, prescribing mandatory shareholder approval to equity compensation 
schemes and long-term incentive plans that involve or may involve the issuance 
of new shares. In addition of such programs being disclosed in the company’s by-
laws, a positive resolution of shareholders in general meeting is required prior to 
their adoption. Such agreement must specify the number of shares to be 
delivered, the strike price, the referenced share price and the vesting period. The 
fact that shareholders are called to vote not only fosters much desired investor 
activism but is also likely to have a signaling effect on rent-extracting managers 
that have to negotiate individual granting contracts with the board following full 
disclosure of the main terms of the plan. 
 
Additionally, stock option plans in place before January the 1st, 2000 have to be 
submitted to the annual meeting for shareholder approval. They should be further 
disclosed by filing a report to the CNMV.  
 
Over time, a number of European Union Directives were incorporated into 
Spanish law, providing for a much desired convergence and consistency across 
the EU. Another relevant piece of regulation is the Ley 26/2003, so-called 
‘Transparency Law’, passed on July 17, 2003. It modifies both the Ley del 
Mercado de Valores and the Ley de Sociedades Anónimas and aims at enhancing 
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transparency from listed companies. It requires them to fill an annual report on 
corporate governance for public disclosure. This path of increased regulatory 
oversight was topped by the Ley de Economía Sostenible in 2011, and more 
recently by the Ley 31/2014, which modified the Ley de Sociedades de Capital, 
focusing on improved disclosure of compensation agreements and binding 
approval by the general shareholders meeting.   
 
10.1.1 Say-On-Pay  
 
A relevant change to the pay setting process was introduced by the Dodd Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) passed in 
July 2010. The new regulation requires public companies to submit executive 
compensation agreements to shareholders’ vote, broadly known as ‘say-on-pay’ 
votes –not only pay packages involving new shares/dilution but all compensation. 
Such advisory consultation must be held at least once every three years. 
Additionally, listed companies should get shareholders’ approval on the 
frequency of the say-on-pay vote –such ‘frequency’ vote is to be held at least 
once every six years.  
 
The U.S. evidence following the implementation of this advisory vote shows that 
the vast majority of companies (close to 98 per cent according to SEC reports, 
2013) have received favorable votes on the proposed executive compensation 
packages. It should be noted, however, that the very few negative votes indeed 
arose from perceived ‘pay for performance’ de-linkages. Getting a ‘no’ is not per 
se binding, that is, it does not force the company to withdraw or change the 
compensation proposal as long as, with the assistance of independent advisors, 
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the case can be made that the objected pay proposal is deemed necessary to 
attract or retain executives.  
 
With regards to stock option plans, some companies have indeed tightened the 
pay-performance connection in their plans, so as to prevent a potential rejection 
in the annual meetings. A case that quickly made the headlines in the U.S. was 
that of General Electric, which pushed the vesting and added performance 
hurdles for the options granted to his CEO. As a general note, it can be stated 
that say-on-pay rules have prompted companies to improve their pay disclosure 
practices, a significant step forward in terms of increased transparency, and a 
much sought-after goal that triggered this new regulation altogether.  
 
The above mentioned rationale can be translated to the Spanish case, as a result 
of a regulatory thread initiated with the Ley del Mercado de Valores (LMV), 
modified by the Ley de Economía Sostenible (LES) in 2011, later modified by the 
Ley 31/2014, which updates the Ley de Sociedades de Capital (LSC). The current 
legal prescription requires the firm’s compensation policy –developed by the 
Compensation Committee and approved by the Board- to be submitted to the 
general shareholders meeting for final, binding approval, at least every three 
years. The relevant change introduced by the Ley 31/2014 (LSC) is that the ‘say-
on-pay’ is extended to the annual compensation report that listed companies have 
to file along with their corporate governance report. That means that such annual 
compensation report is also submitted to the general shareholders meeting, but 
for a non-binding vote. Yet if shareholders reject the annual compensation report, 
this rejection triggers a review of the overall compensation policy, which the 
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Board would need to redesign in order to get a new, binding approval of the 
general shareholders meeting. So, on a practical note, the prior three-year 
approval may indeed be reviewed in the event of a rejection of the annual 
compensation report. These complementay prescriptions combine the general 
oversight of the compensation policy design, with the regular (yearly) disclosure 
mandate, hence aiming at aligning design and execution –and otherwise adjusting 
deviations.  
 
In terms of implementation, in 2013, 54 per cent of Ibex 35 firms got a negative 
vote on different features of the proposed executive compensation packages, 
ranging from broad issues of design transparency, composition of the Nomination 
and Remuneration Committee, to concerns on the dilution effects of equity-based 
pay. This increased awareness and activism on the part of proxy advisors and 
institutional investors is indeed expected to rise. As a result, the quality and 
quantity of compensation disclosure by Spanish listed companies is likely to 
improve. 
 
10.2 Labor Law Insights 
 
The relevance of stock options as a preferred means of variable compensation has 
increased over time. Employees expect to share in the firm’s profits as options 
become a recurrent feature in the executive pay mix. 
 
Even if labor law issues have seldom taken center stage in the design and 
implementation of stock options plans -as tax law remains pivotal-, there are 
some relevant points that deserve careful attention. 
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Stock options are intrinsically linked to the labor contract, as the option holder 
has to be in the payroll to be able to exercise vested options.  
 
Termination, whether for cause or not, is a common issue for lawsuits. Most 
plans state that unvested options are forfeited when an employee terminates 
employment, but this is not universally the case. Employees still might argue that 
their termination was inappropriate and perhaps even that they were terminated 
so that the company would not have to deal with all their options. As far as 
vested options, some specified time to exercise in-the-money options is usually 
granted. Some plans also state that unexercised but vested options are cancelled 
if an employee is terminated for cause. Finally, plans usually have provisions for 
options to forfeit if an employee goes to work for a competitor, certainly a less 
debatable issue. The plan and the contract with the optionee should therefore 
clearly spell out the treatment of stock options upon termination of employment. 
The above turns largely normative when it comes to Ibex 35 firms, as stock 
options contracts in Spanish large caps tend to provide rather limited labor 
related information.   
 
After a fairly lengthy debate, the salary nature of stock options is already widely 
recognized. This is consistent with its revised accounting treatment as a 
compensation expense, as discussed in section 11. 
 
Recognizing stock options as salary implies computing them for severance pay, 
which is arguably the focal issue from a labor law perspective –the intrinsic 
value gain upon exercise is acknowledged as salary, not the future gain from 
selling the acquired shares. However, Spanish labor law has no explicit 
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provisions on whether stock options qualify as salary or should be included when 
calculating termination pay. As a result, court rulings, largely recognizing stock 
options as salary, tend to build up meaningful precedents.  
 
The debate has nonetheless switched from acknowledging stock options as 
compensation –claimed by employees and endorsed by courts- to arguing whether 
options represent compensation for past services rendered or an incentive for 
future performance used for retention purposes. The focus on whether stock 
options represent compensation for past or future services, rather than whether 
the stock options have vested, may encourage terminated employees seeking 
compensation for unvested stock options. 
 
The principle of equal treatment has to be observed if a group of employees with 
comparable qualifications is granted stock options. If any of the individuals of 
such a group is excluded from the benefit for no compelling reason, then he may 
assert contravention of the said principle.  
 
10.3 Tax Treatment 
 
Becoming vested in a stock option and exercising that option are different things, 
with different tax implications. On exercise of an option, the optionee acquires 
the underlying stock by paying the strike price –or else cashes in the intrinsic 
value gain. If acquiring the shares, the employee can hold them (exercise and 
hold) or sell them (exercise and sell). Exercising the option triggers a tax event. 
By and large options are not taxed on granting but on exercising –Spain adheres 
to this dominant practice. Taxing options on granting would trigger serious 
valuation problems derived from the contingent nature of the award. At present, 
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only Belgium taxes stock options at grant date. There are no valuation 
uncertainties on exercise, as the taxable income equals the intrinsic value of the 
option (the difference between the underlying stock price and the strike price). 
 
Until vested, the Ibex 35 optionee holds a non-transferable right entitling to a 
contingent profit (if ending up in-the-money). Taxes are eventually due at two 
points in time: 
-when exercising the option, the intrinsic value gain is taxed as in-kind 
compensation, 
-when selling the acquired shares, the capital gain –or loss- goes into computing 
the beneficiary’s tax liability.   
 
Following the personal income tax (IRPF) reform of 2014 (effective on January 
1st, 2015), taxes due on exercise would be waived had the stock option plan be 
braod-based, i.e. granted to all employees in the firm, or at least to all in the 
same group or subgroup. Otherwise, a 30 percent reduction (formely 40 percent) 
on taxable income, up to 300.000 euros, could apply as long as options are not 
granted yearly, the exercise price is not paid out in installments, and the options 
are exercised after 2 years following the grant –all clear signals when it comes to 
designing the stock option plan. Additionally, the amount to which this 30 
percent reduction applies is limited to the result of multiplying the annual 
average income of IRPF taxpayers by the exercise period (from granting to 
exercise, in years). Yet this reduction would not apply for income that becomes 
taxable after two years if in the previous five year the tax payer has benefited 
from this tax break –a temporary waiver of this constraint was passed for options 
granted before 2015.  
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Beyond this limit, the optionee’s marginal tax bracket would apply. As usual, 
taxes are partially withheld by the company. Regardless of taxable income be 
legally labeled as ‘in cash’ (if the plan provides for full cashless exercise, i.e. no 
shares are received but the spread in cash) or ‘in-kind’ (shares are received on 
option exercise), due personal income tax is equally calculated on the spread gain 
and benefits from the reduction above described. 
 
When shares are later sold, regular tax on capital gains should be recognized. 
The gain will be computed as the difference between the proceeds (sale price) 
and the acquisition cost.  
 
For the Ibex 35 firm granting the stock option, there would be a hit to earnings 
that is tax-deductible, as stock options are recognized as an expense.   
 
The interplay of personal and corporate tax rates is likely to shape compensation 
practices. If the marginal personal tax rate becomes higher than the corporate tax, 
dividend payout would fall, putting pressure on the stock price and earnings, and 
then on executives to meet short-term increased expectations. That is detrimental 
to the long-term value creation pursued with equity-based compensation.  
 
The impact on the bottom line –and in the tax check- would differ according to 
the company’s hedging strategy. If the risk of having to settle in-the-money 
options is passed on to a financial institution –the risk is hedged away-, as done 
by many Ibex 35 granting firms, then the premium paid to hedge the stock option 
is expensed over the vesting period -and tax-deducted. If no hedging is provided, 
the company can deal with option exercise either issuing equity or using treasury 
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stock. Assuming new equity is issued at the strike price -and beyond the dilution 
effect already discussed-, no further charges other than issuing costs –tax 
deductible- should be accrued. As far as treasury stock, the standard valuation 
practices for investments apply until option exercise –if ending up in-the-money-
, with the usual tax treatment of gains (and losses) arising from such treasury 
holdings. 
 
11. Accounting Debate 
 
Accounting for stock options was for long a very controversial topic. Those in 
favor of expensing the options argue that they are a form of compensation and 
therefore should be expensed. They blame the lack of expensing as key factor for 
burst ‘bubbles’ in the market by failing to adjust earnings –and therefore stock 
prices- by the value of the options granted.  
 
Critics of mandatory expensing argue in turn that so doing depresses earnings 
and thus makes it more difficult to raise capital and retain employees.  
 
Others just claim that provided there is full disclosure -either as a footnote or as 
charge to earnings-, the market should be indifferent to the accounting rules for 
stock options. Relying on the efficient market hypothesis, they contend that 
market prices adjust for public (disclosed) information regardless of such 
disclosure being an expense or a footnote to the financial statements. In theory 
this view may be justified. In practice, however, information that is disclosed but 
remains off the accounting statements is unlikely to be fully incorporated into the 
stock price. 
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11.1 The Background 
 
The case is whether compensation expense should be recognized for stock 
options and, if so, the periods over which it should be allocated.  
 
On a comparative basis, an again looking at the U.S. as front-runner in the 
granting of stock options, before 1995, the provisions of the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB) Opinion 25, issued in 1972, determined accounting for 
stock options. APB Opinion 25 priced stock options using the intrinsic value 
method, whereby compensation expense was determined as the excess of the 
stock price at the measurement date (generally, the grant date) over the option 
exercise price. Because most stock options have exercise prices at least equal to 
current market prices (at-the-money), no compensation expense was recognized. 
This approach ignored any likelihood that the stock price would exceed the 
exercise price in the future. 
 
In June 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) attempted to 
recognize the reality of stock option value by issuing the FASB Statement 123, 
which required pricing the option upon the many factors that reflect its 
underlying value. Therefore, total compensation expense was to be based on the 
fair value of the options on the grant date. No adjustments would be made after 
the grant date in response to subsequent changes in the stock price. Fair value 
was to be estimated using Black-Scholes or binomial option-pricing models.  
 
Massive opposition to this fair value method, led primarily by industries making 
significant use of stock options, forced FASB to compromise. In 1995, FASB 
decided to encourage, rather than require, recognition of compensation cost based 
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upon the fair value method and to require expanded disclosures. In other words, 
SFAS 123 required companies that continued to follow APB 25 and did not 
include stock-option expenses in the income statement, to disclose in the notes to 
financial statements what such expenses would have been. 
 
11.2 Revised Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
 
The issue of expensing stock options eventually regained center stage following 
the widespread concern over deceptive accounting practices at companies 
accused of fraud (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat). Stunned investors began to 
demand tougher accounting standards for increased transparency in corporate 
reporting. FASB responded to heightened interest in improved financial reporting 
with the release in December 2004 of FASB 123 (Revised), Share-Based 
Payment. FASB required public and non-public companies to recognize stock-
based compensation in their income statements starting in 2006.  
 
11.3 Converging practices 
The move towards expensing was indeed global. The FASB proposal replicated 
that of its European counterpart, the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG) and both were sponsored by the initiative of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The IASB had already passed rules 
requiring the expensing of options. Since January 1, 2005 treasurers of stock in 
European Union (EU) capital markets have to treat the cost of providing stock 
options as an expense on their financial statements. 
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The International Financial Reporting Standard 2, issued by the IASB in 
February 2004 "requires an entity to reflect in its profit or loss and financial 
position the effects of share-based payment transactions, including expenses 
associated with transactions in which share options are granted to employees" 
(page 2). The EU Commission Guideline 211/2005 followed, with further details 
on the accounting treatment of the expense. 
 
Full convergence of international accounting standards is however yet to be 
achieved, which is highly detrimental for comparability and overall pricing of 
assets. In the EU, conformity with IASB standards is mandatory for all listed 
companies. So that is the case for Spain, where the Central Bank has reinforced 
the practice by requiring financial institutions to accrue stock options as an 
expense in their income statements (Circular 4/2004). 
 
11.4 Pricing stock options 
Because stock options are not transferable and employees’ ability to hedge them 
is restricted, the value of the option to the issuing firm is not the same as the 
value to the beneficiary. The relevant value to account for would be the value to 
the issuing firm.  
 
The debate remains open around the pricing of stock options. Most companies 
apply the Black-Scholes option-pricing model, developed by Nobel laurates 
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 1973. As summarized by Apostolou and 
Crumbley (2005), this model calculates the present value of a stock option at the 
grant date, based upon specific information about the terms of the option and 
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assumptions about future stock price performance. The value of an option reflects 
the estimate of the price that someone would pay in the market today for the 
option. Apostolou and Crumbley (2005) go on to remind that the Black-Scholes 
option-pricing model has non-trivial limitations, notably that it was developed 
for traded options which have no vesting requirements and are fully transferable. 
 
Accounting standards do not specify which option-pricing model firms should 
apply in accounting for the stock option fair value, yet they recommend using 
either Black-Scholes or lattice (e.g. binomial) models.  
 
 
11.5 Effect on design 
  
The change in accounting for stock options provides companies an excellent 
opportunity to examine their equity incentive programs, so as to determine if the 
have effectively linked the expense or cost of these programs to the company, to 
the value perceived by the employees and their performance. 
 
Under the fair value method, compensation cost is measured at the grant date 
based on the fair value of the award as opposed to the intrinsic value based 
method, which only measures the excess of the market price over the exercise 
price. In general, stock options are granted at the money and therefore have no 
intrinsic value at the grant date –in the past, no intrinsic value meant no expense.  
 
With expensing as the rule, the incentive to grant compensation while eluding the 
charge to earnings is no longer there. The opportunity emerges for companies to 
design option programs that have performance/market conditions. Increases in 
earnings per share, return on equity or customer satisfaction should become usual 
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vesting features in optimal contracting design. But persuading managers to give 
up risk-free –and performance-free- at-the-money stock options is likely to take a 
diligent board and a a fair amount of shareholder activism.  
 
Expensing options could also be the reason why many firms have chosen to hold 
back stock option grants. While the debate around accounting for stock options 
as a compensation expense is seemingly over, the one on the option contract 
design so as to maximize incentive alignment hereby studied, remains heated.  
 
12. Conclusions – Theoretical and Managerial Implications, Limitations and 
Further Research 
 
Stock options offer large shared benefits for both management and shareholders, 
but unless carefully designed, their potential may evaporate. 
 
By conducting a systematic analysis of stock option contract design in large 
capitalization listed companies in Spain –using the Ibex 35 index as proxy-, this 
research expects to feed the current debate –both in the literature as in the 
market- on stock options as efficient compensation tools. Given the mounting 
demand for higher pay-to-performance sensitivity, and as a contribution to 
managerial practice, this empirical study aims at increased incentive-alignment in 
the design of stock option plans in Spanish firms. From an agency theory 
perspective, a blend of the optimal contracting and the managerial power 
approaches are applied to identify significant deviations from the incentive-
alignment paradigm.  
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Managers are likely to exert control over the amount of money they get. 
However, generalizing that all managers selfishly engage in a rent-extracting 
behavior would be at least a questionable assumption. Individual motivations are 
more broadly based, as psychological economics claims and stewardship theory 
reinforces. Agency theory need not necessarily be confronted with stewardship 
theory. Managers can –and are expected to- be stewards of corporate goals. The 
threat that they may misuse their delegated control over the firm’s assets is 
however likely to make agency theory preferable when it comes to design 
compensation contracts.  
 
Self-serving managers should be counterbalanced by diligent boards in order to 
reach incentive-aligning contracts. Such contracts should follow optimal 
contracting rationale yet would be seasoned by some managerial power inevitably 
built in the pay-setting process. Corporate governance guidelines should 
contribute to reach such balanced outcome. Avoiding excessive management 
influence over board composition and promoting shareholder activism are among 
the initiatives that would eventually secure arm’s length bargaining when dealing 
with compensation contract design.  
 
The recurrent choice of the at-the-money exercise price, along with the near-
universal absence of performance-vesting practices suggests some degree of 
managerial power influencing the pay-setting process in our sampled firms. 
Converserly, the construct of vesting to maturity ratio hereby developed, that 
accounts for the option exercise window, points at a fair amount of optimal 
contracting informing the contract design, as Ibex 35 optionees are largely given 
limited time to exercise their vested options. When looking at repricing, optimal 
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contracting arguably prevails in our sampled firms, as none of them allows this 
controversial practice. Finally, post-exercise trading restrictions remain rather 
rare among Ibex 35 firms –only four companies set such constraint-, yet the 
observed inverse relationship to vesting –longer vesting to make up for no 
trading restrictions, as argued in this study- suggests a blend of optimal 
contracting and managerial power shaping the stock option contract. 
 
Furthering the empirical nature of this study, in an effort to draw evidence-based 
conclusions, a panel data analysis is conducted, so as to quantitatively test the 
hypotheses that stock options do positively impact the firm’s risk-adjusted 
returns and so does the choice of contract design. Both claims are validated for 
the sampled firms, yet with varying degrees of significancy. Such an outcome 
suggests the value of replicating the study at a future date and/or with longer 
time series as opportunities for future research.  
 
Despite recent declines in the use of stock options, they are still a significant 
component of long-term incentives in large capitalization firms. The use of a 
broader portfolio of compensation tools could be explained by the fact that the 
right mix for each individual company is a function of many different factors, 
including firm size, maturity, profitability and cash-flow. 
 
This study examines compensation practices in large listed Spanish firms, where 
stock options could act as a remedy to agency problems arising from significant 
ownership dispersion. It follows that the findings hereby discussed, and their 
implications, apply to the sampled companies, and potentially to the large 
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capitalization set they represent, bound by the specificities of the Spanish 
marketplace, over the fairly extensive time frame considered.  
 
In today’s increasingly globalized financial and labor markets, where human 
capital is an undeniable source of competitive advantage, the design of 
compensation contracts should be appraisable and as such factorable into stock 
prices. By the same token, the war for talent asks for comparability in pay 
practices, so as to attract, retain and motivate diverse and bounderyless 
employees. So building on that, extending this research to the study of stock 
option contracts across different markets, represents another opportunity for 
future research.  
 
Compensation contract design, along with dilution and expensing remain 
shareholders’ biggest concerns when it comes to stock options. However, 
incentive-aligning contracts yield positive net present value when dilution and 
compensation costs are lower than the incremental shareholder value created by 
managers provided with properly designed incentives.  
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